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Rethinking Modes of Political Influence: Catherine de‟ Medici and her Female Political Network 
 
Kelly A. Benner 
 
Though previous studies on the political career of Catherine de‟ Medici have been male-centric, 
focusing primarily on Catherine‟s relationships with her sons and male noblemen, it is the 
contention of this thesis that Catherine amassed a female-based political network during her 
tenure as Queen mother. Comprised of both her female relatives and the noblewomen that 
surrounded her at court, Catherine used this system of females to manipulate both domestic and 
foreign politics. The first chapter of this thesis will focus on Catherine‟s political purpose for her 
eldest and youngest daughters, Élisabeth de Valois (consort of Philip II of Spain) and Marguerite 
de Valois (first wife of Henri IV of France). The second chapter will next examine the role of 
Catherine‟s three daughters-in-law, Mary Stuart, Queen of Scots, Elisabeth of Austria, and 
Louise de Lorraine-Vaudémont within her political network. The final chapter will then 
concentrate on two members of Catherine‟s infamous “flying squadron,” Louise de La 
Béraudière, also known as “la belle Rouhet” and Charlotte de Sauve respectively, and how the 
Queen mother utilized them to manage potentially troublesome noblemen at court. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Considering her comparatively low origins and the presence of affluent royal mistresses 
for much of her marriage to King Henri II, how did Queen Catherine de‟ Medici become one of 
the most dominant figures in sixteenth-century politics, especially when the “French monarchy 
was quite stingy allowing women in positions of political power”?
1
   The majority of scholarship 
on Catherine‟s political career after her husband‟s death contends, as historian Katherine 
Crawford so eloquently puts it, that Catherine was able to assume the reins of power through her 
utilization of “accepted notions of female behavior” and her “conformity with familiar and 
acceptable [gender] roles.”
2
   In other words, it was her ability to utilize male conceptions of 
maternal protectiveness within male spheres of influence to control her male offspring and to 
manipulate male nobles that allowed her to gain political power during her sons‟ minorities.  
At the same time, what about her relationship to the royal and noblewomen who 
surrounded her?  My thesis will investigate whether Catherine de‟ Medici was able to use her 
network of female relations and noblewomen to extend her political influence during the reigns 
of her sons and to allow her to preserve her “authority” as they entered maturity. Though her use 
of female networks during her tenure as Queen mother was not as significant as her ability to 
control the men around her for political gain, this thesis will examine how these court women, 
who are often marginalized in the historiography of the period, were used by Catherine. Could 
they have helped mold international and domestic politics to benefit France and help prolong 
Catherine‟s own political influence? 
As already implied, one of the most important contributions that this thesis can make to 
the scholarship on Catherine de‟ Medici‟s political career is that it could shed a different light on 
                                                          
1
 Katherine Crawford, “Catherine de Medici and the Performance of Political Motherhood,” The Sixteenth Century 
Journal 31, 3 (Autumn 2000): 644. 
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how Catherine accumulated and maintained political power. In addition to being depicted as 
“cold, cruel, calculating, treacherous and evil,” much of the scholarship depicting Catherine‟s 
participation in French politics in the four centuries after her death was primarily concerned with 
Catherine‟s manipulation of her young sons during their minorities.
3
 Though N.M. Sutherland‟s 
scholarship on Catherine de‟ Medici during the 1970s did much to revise the menacing light in 
which Catherine had been depicted, it did little to alter the view on how Catherine had exercised 
her authority.
4
 In a 2003 essay, Margaret Hoogvliet, focused on how Catherine used architectural 
projects and court festivals both to legitimize and to attach a sense of kingly power to her sons 
whom she controlled.
5
  More recently, Katherine Crawford has asserted that Catherine‟s position 
as regent “rested above all on being a good mother” to her male offspring and used the “language 
of affection around motherhood to legitimize her regency.”
6
  In short, Hoogvliet, like Crawford, 
implies that Catherine‟s power rested on her “natural authority over her sons.”
7
 Recent 
biographers of Catherine de‟ Medici do little to elucidate how the Queen mother utilized the 
women around her for her own benefit. Relating Catherine‟s political career in a largely 




                                                          
3
 N.M. Sutherland, “Catherine De Medici: The Legend of the Wicked Italian Queen,” The Sixteenth Century Journal 
9, 2 (July 1978).  
4
 Ibid., 56.  
5 Hoogvliet, Margriet. “Princely Culture and Catherine de Médicis,” in Princes and Princely Culture, 1450-1650, 
ed. by Martin Gosman, Alasdair MacDonald, and Arie Johan Vanderjagt,  vol. 1. (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2003).  
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6
 Katherine Crawford, Perilous Performances: Gender and Regency in Early Modern France (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2004), 30, 38. 
7
 Hoogvliet, “Princely Culture,” 129.  
8
 R.J. Knecht, Catherine de’ Medici (New York, NY: Longman, 1998); Leonie Frieda, Catherine de Medici: 




This thesis also proposes to examine how early modern women participated in clientage 
and dynastic networks, an issue that remains surprisingly under-studied. Of course, the subject of 
female-oriented kinship and patron-client systems is not necessarily a new topic of discussion 
within the historiography of the early modern period. In fact, as early as 1972, Nancy L. Roelker 
examined “networks of noble women” in which female court-style groups formed around a 
prominent noblewoman on the basis of blood, marriage, and social and religious ties.
9
  However, 
since Roelker‟s seminal article, that arguably “corrected the historical record by adding women 
to [early modern French] history,” there have been comparatively few works concentrating on 
the subject of female networks specifically in France since its publication.
10
   
Sharon Kettering, who wrote a multitude of works on client-patronage systems in 
sixteenth and seventeenth-century France, only published two pieces of scholarship focusing 
solely on the networks and patronage powers of prominent noblewomen, and these studies were 
primarily centered on economic, not political, patronage.
11
 According to Kettering, political 
patronage could only be distributed by royal women, which in retrospect, partially explains why 
there has been such a dearth in studies of political patronage amongst noblewomen. On the other 
hand, Penny Richard‟s more recent articles on the Guise women does touch upon the political 
activities of notable Leaguer females such as Anne d‟Este and Catherine de Clèves, but, Richards 
describes their role as being more symbolic than material.
12
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Despite the paucity of scholarship on female patronage in early modern France, in the 
past ten years there have been several books and essays written on the subject of female 
networks and the role of women within aristocratic kinship systems. In a 1996 article, Joanne 
Baker focused on female social networks centered around the abbey of Saint Pierre de Reims, 
which was headed by a female member of the Guise family. Despite the fact that the Guise 
family was unable to reap the benefits of an arranged marriage when placing its female members 
within the abbey, Baker asserts that these women played a significant role in “family strategies 
and dynastic planning.”
13
  In addition to raising the family‟s spiritual prestige, they also 
solidified the dynasty‟s presence within the Catholic Church.
14
  Four years later, Sara Chapman 
published her study of the Phelypeaux de Pontchartrain family during the reign of Louis XIV. 
Though women themselves could not hold public office, Chapman describes these females as 
having to “cultivate and maintain” their husbands‟ network of friends and political alliances.
15
  
In terms of early modern French dynastic networks, two notable essays describe how 
family heads utilized female relations to help obtain their political goals. The first is Robert 
Oresko‟s study of the nieces of Jules Cardinal Mazarin. In addition to assuaging Mazarin‟s 
political dilemmas within France, Oresko‟s 1995 article describes the marital alliances brokered 
by Mazarin for his nieces as helping to strengthen France foreign policy, since the French 
monarchy did not have any princesses of marriageable age during his tenure at court.
16
 The 
second is Simon Hodson‟s short essay on the political and religious network forged by Louise de 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Munns and Penny Richards, “Exploiting and Destabilizing Gender Roles: Anne d‟Este,” French History 6, 2 (1992): 
206-7. 
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15
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Phelypeaux de Pontchartran Family,” French Historical Studies 24, 1 (Winter 2001): 17.  
16
 Robert Oresko, “The Marriages of the Nieces of Cardinal Mazarin: Public Policy and Private Strategy in 





Coligny, princess of Orange through the marriages of her stepdaughters. Concentrating on a 
sixteenth-century network that was both led by a French woman and held together by females, 
Hodson‟s 2007 essay describes Louise de Coligny as using the marital alliances of her female 
relations to realize her political and Pan-Calvinist goals.
17
   
Despite the relative dearth of scholarship on political and clientage networks comprised 
of French women and centered on the sixteenth century, historians of other European regions, 
especially Great Britain, have made significant progress in explaining how female networks 
functioned during the early modern period. Within the field of British history, nearly every 
biography of so called great ladies, even those written by popular historians, have pages 
dedicated to the increased political patronage power of women at the Tudor court. Focusing on 
more serious scholarship, both Eric Ives‟s and John H. King‟s scholarship on Anne Boleyn and 
Katharine Parr respectively describes how these consorts were able to dispense political and 
clerical patronage to raise the prestige of their family and to help further their religious causes.
18
  
Works on both royal and aristocratic female networks are likewise more numerous when 
centered on Great Britain. Though it is a more localized study, Melissa Franklin-Harkrider‟s 
account of Katherine Brandon, Duchess of Suffolk and the aristocracy of Lincolnshire 
concentrates to a degree on the role that Brandon‟s religious “circle” played in the expansion of 
Protestantism in England.
19
 Franklin-Harkrider‟s work is accompanied by Barbara Harris‟s 
scholarship on kinship networks among aristocratic women during the fifteenth and sixteenth-
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 Eric Ives, The Life and Death of Anne Boleyn (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2005); John H. King, “Patronage 
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 There has also been resurgence of interest in the role of ladies-in-waiting, and their 
relationships to their mistresses at court, as exemplified by Anne Somerset‟s and Natalie Mears 
scholarship, in addition to Helen Payne‟s more recent essay on the political influence of women 
at the Jacobean court.
21
 Shifting from the British Isles to the Iberian Peninsula, Magdalena 
Sanchez‟s book on the political system forged by Maria, the dowager Holy Roman Empress, her 
daughter, the nun Margaret of the Cross, and her female relation Margaret of Austria, spouse of 
Philip III, is another prominent work of scholarship that focuses on how groups of early modern 
women could alter both domestic and foreign politics by working in concert with each other.
22
 
In summary, Catherine de‟ Medici‟s acquisition of political influence has long been 
ascribed to her ability to control her young sons, as well as to her knack for utilizing accepted 
notions of maternity and femininity to help legitimate her regency to her male nobles. However, 
this thesis will examine whether Catherine de‟ Medici was also reliant on the females around her, 
most notably her daughters, daughters-in-law, and ladies-in-waiting to help maintain political 
authority as well as to benefit the domestic and foreign policy goals of the French crown. It will 
also perhaps also fill a hole in the historiography of early modern patron-client and kinship 
systems. The majority of those works that focus on the patronage power of women in early 
modern France are primarily centered on domestic and artistic patronage, and much of the 
scholarship on exclusively female networks is either focused on countries other than France, or 
not set in the sixteenth-century. My intent is that this present work will provide one of the first 
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 Barbara J. Harris, English Aristocratic Women, 1450-1550: Marriage and Family, Property and Careers (Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press, 2002); Barbara J. Harris, “Sisterhood, Friendship and the Power of English 
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extensive looks at how sixteenth-century female networks in France manipulated the course of 
national politics.  
This thesis will be divided into three chapters, with each chapter dedicated to how 
Catherine‟s daughters, daughters-in-law, and finally her noblewomen figured into Catherine‟s 
political system. The first chapter will focus on how Catherine de‟ Medici used her daughters 
Élisabeth de Valois, Queen of Spain and Marguerite de Valois, Queen of Navarre and France, to 
both solidify her own power base and to rectify France‟s domestic and foreign policy troubles. 
Catherine de‟ Medici did not broker the marriage between her daughter Élisabeth and Philip II, 
King of Spain, however, Catherine certainly capitalized on Philip‟s fondness for Catherine‟s 
young and attractive daughter even after Élisabeth‟s death. Though the Queen mother‟s initial 
intentions for marrying Marguerite to Henri de Navarre did not pan out, Catherine used her 
youngest daughter as an intermediary between herself and the French Huguenot party, in an 
attempt to help mitigate tensions between Huguenots and Catholics after the St. Bartholomew‟s 
Day Massacre. 
The second chapter will examine the often neglected relationships between Catherine de‟ 
Medici and her daughters-in-law, Mary Stuart, Queen of Scots, Elisabeth of Austria, and Louise 
de Lorraine-Vaudémont. Though typically understood to be enemies, this chapter will explore 
how Catherine de‟ Medici saw Mary Stuart as an integral component of her political network, 
even after Mary‟s imprisonment in England and despite Mary‟s connections with Catherine‟s 
greatest rivals, members of the house of Lorraine. Regardless of the fact that Charles IX‟s 
consort is so often ignored in the scholarship of the period, this thesis will likewise examine how 
Catherine may have attempted to use her familial relationship with Elisabeth of Austria to 




Louise de Lorraine-Vaudémont, the wife of Catherine‟s favorite son Henri III, this chapter will 
show how Catherine, despite being initially opposed to the match, sought, along with her son, to 
mitigate the strained relations between the troublesome Guise clan and the house of Valois using 
Louise‟s position as queen consort.  
The final chapter will discuss the potential function that Catherine de‟ Medici‟s ladies-in-
waiting had in the realization of Catherine‟s domestic political goals, especially in regard to 
keeping potentially troublesome noblemen in check. Known famously to history as the 
“escadron volant,” or “flying squadron,” Catherine de‟ Medici used this group of attractive 
lower-ranking noblewomen to seduce both troublesome noble grandees and disobedient male 
relatives to discourage these men in their rebellious ventures and make them more amendable to 
Catherine‟s political agenda. The two famous members of the “flying squadron” that will be 
included in this work will be Louise de la Béraudière, mistress of Antoine de Bourbon, king of 
Navarre and Charlotte de Beaune Semblançay, baroness of Sauve, mistress of Catherine‟s son 
(the duke of Alençon) and her son-in-law (Henri de Bourbon, King of Navarre).  
In short, with this three-chapter thesis, which focuses on Catherine de‟ Medici‟s political 
relationship with her daughters, her daughters-in-law, her ladies-in-waiting respectively, my 
intent is to shed new light on how Catherine de‟ Medici, who is arguably one of the most 
powerful women of the early modern period, accumulated and exercised political authority. I 
also desire to draw greater attention to the existence female comprised political networks, and 
how they potentially altered the character of court politics during Catherine‟s tenure as queen 
mother and ultimately impacted the politics of that period.   
Though scholarship on early modern networks has greatly expanded in the last few 




noblemen.  Another salient problem is that those works that do concentrate on the sixteenth-
century female networks are either focused on Ultra-Catholic leaguer females, like the Guise 
women, or on influential protestant noblewomen such Jeanne d‟Albret, Queen of Navarre and 
female relatives of the Admiral Gaspard de Coligny.  In other words, very little attention is paid 
to arguably the most powerful female political system in sixteenth-century France, that of 
Catherine de‟ Medici.  The absence of scholarship on Catherine‟s female political networks, and 
likewise how they were used during her tenure as Queen mother, can be explained in two ways.  
First, particularly in the case of the infamous “escadron volant,” is that there is a lack of sources 
that indicate that Catherine used her female relations and noblewomen in unordinary ways.  The 
second, and most important, is the tendency for historians to concentrate on Catherine‟s 
relationship with her sons and how she likewise used her sons to maneuver within male 
dominated political spheres. Of course, Catherine‟s sons played the most vital role in Catherine‟s 
ability to acquire and maintain political influence.  However, as the examples of these 
aforementioned female will show, Catherine‟s ability to utilize the women around her also 



















Chapter 1: Catherine‟s Daughters 
 
 As already mentioned, this chapter examines the purpose Catherine had for her daughters 
within her political network and will focus specifically on Catherine‟s eldest and youngest 
daughters, Élisabeth, who would marry Philip II, king of Spain in 1559 and Marguerite, who 
would marry Henri de Bourbon, king of Navarre, respectively. Using primarily Catherine‟s 
published correspondence, which provides the most extensive, though at times overly sanitized, 
look at Catherine‟s respective political relationships with her daughters, the main focus of 
chapter will be to examine what domestic and foreign policy crises Catherine sought to avert 
with the presence of her daughter in their respective positions of power in foreign courts. It will 
likewise analyze how the mere presence of these two women, as a symbol of political amity 
between the French crown and the Spanish and Navaresse monarchies, may have induced their 
respective husbands to make friendly political gestures toward both the French monarch and the 
Queen mother. Though a degree of self-interest undoubtedly played a role in Élisabeth‟s and 
Marguerite‟s acquiescence to Catherine‟s political designs, it seems that this kinship-based 
political system that included Catherine‟s daughters was largely built upon sense of duty to 
Catherine and the French crown.   
 
Élisabeth de Valois: Queen of Spain 
Of Catherine de‟ Medici‟s daughters, it was undoubtedly Élisabeth, who despite her short 
life, would play the most significant role in the realization of her mother‟s foreign policy goals.  
The eldest of Catherine‟s daughters, Élisabeth was born on April 2, 1545 in the Château de 




eldest “fille de France” would help bring political stability to the French realm and to Europe.
23
 
Her birth coinciding with a peace agreement made between her grandfather François I and the 
English King Henry VIII, Henry VIII was made Élisabeth‟s godfather in a gesture of good faith 
on François I‟s part to strengthen the tenuous rapprochement between the English and French 
royal houses. According to that great chronicler of Valois court life Pierre de Bourdeille, better 
known as seigneur de Brantôme, the young and virtuous Élisabeth seemed destined to be a great 
lady, earning the admiration of the court, especially that of her father Henri II and her mother 
Catherine de‟ Medici, though it would later become quite evident that her younger sister Claude 
was the favorite daughter of Queen Catherine.
24
 
Regardless of his wife‟s personal preferences, Henri II was astutely aware of his eldest 
daughter‟s potential for building cordial and mutually beneficial relations with other European 
powers.  Since France was still at war with the Habsburg Empire, it was initially Henri II‟s great 
ambition to marry Élisabeth to the boy King of England, Edward VI, in an attempt to 
counterbalance Habsburg hegemony on the continent, which was currently suffocating France 
from all directions.
25
 Unfortunately for Henri II, Edward VI‟s premature death in 1553 not only 
squashed his marital aspirations for his eldest daughter, but also led to the accession of the half-
Spanish Queen Mary Tudor, who abandoned the Anglo-French conciliatory policy favored by 
her half-brother Edward VI, and instead renewed friendly relations with her Habsburg relatives, 
culminating in a marriage between Charles V‟s heir Philip, prince of Asturias and herself. 
Despite the entrance of the English into the conflict on the side of the Empire, the Habsburg-
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Valois Wars raged on for much of 1550s with both sides finally agreeing to sign a peace 
agreement in April 1559 at Cateau-Cambrésis.  
As the wars concluded, Henri II arranged for his second eldest daughter Claude to marry 
Charles III, duke of Lorraine, even though Élisabeth was still unmarried. According to 
Brantôme, Henri II‟s lack of propriety in marrying off a younger daughter before the eldest 
disconcerted many of his courtiers. Upon being asked for his reasoning in this match, Henri II 
was supposed to have replied that his “daughter Élisabeth is such that a duchy is not for her to 
marry. She must have a kingdom.”
26
 Regardless of whether or not this colorful anecdote actually 
occurred, it seems that Henri II‟s foresight in postponing Élisabeth‟s engagement would pay off 
in the long-term. A major turning point in the course of sixteenth-century international relations, 
the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis ushered in a reconciliatory phase in Valois-Habsburg relations, 
which allowed Henri II to turn his attention towards eliminating a new menace, the spread of 
Protestantism. In order eradicate Calvinism from within his realm, Henri II needed to ensure that 
there would continue to be peace between himself and his once great enemy the Spanish 
monarch, so, Henri II resorted to a time-honored means of solidifying political alliances, 
arranging a marital alliance between his eldest daughter Élisabeth and the Spanish Habsburgs.
27
 
In the initial negotiations, Élisabeth was at first offered up by Henri II as a potential bride for 
Don Carlos, prince of Asturias, and the eldest son of the recently crowned King Philip II. 
However, events necessitated that Philip take Élisabeth for himself since his wife, Mary Tudor, 
had died in 1558 and his son Don Carlos‟s physical and mental incapacities were becoming 
increasingly apparent at the Spanish court.  
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 Since the match between King Philip and her daughter Élisabeth was engineered during 
the reign of her husband, when she was a comparatively insignificant political figure due to the 
influence of Henri II‟s maitresse en titre, Diane de Poitiers, it is unlikely that Catherine had any 
considerable role in the marriage‟s fruition. However, as time would show, Catherine became 
one of the marriage‟s main beneficiaries.  In July 1559, while jousting in a tournament 
celebrating the marriage between Élisabeth and the king of Spain, King Henri II was pierced 
through the eye with a lance and succumbed to his wounds a few days later, leaving his fifteen-
year-old son, François, king of France.
28
  Despite Catherine‟s status as Queen Mother, the Guise 
enacted a swift “coup d’état” causing the duke of Guise and the cardinal of Lorraine to assume 
real power.
29
  With François II‟s death in 1560 and the accession of her second eldest son 
Charles IX, Catherine was better able to assert her position as Queen Mother and with the aid of 
her new ally Antoine de Bourbon, king of Navarre, the Queen Mother regent and the royal tutelle 
were able to push the Guise out of power.
30
  However, the house of Lorraine was still a force to 
be reckoned with, and though the king of Navarre had at least temporarily supplicated himself to 
Catherine, his younger brother Louis I de Bourbon, prince de Condé was making preparations for 
war against the regency.  It was under these circumstances, that Élisabeth de Valois, now queen 
of Spain, became the cornerstone of Catherine‟s female network.  
 It is difficult to gauge Élisabeth‟s contribution to the machinations of Catherine de‟ 
Medici during the reign of François II, since the young boy‟s tenure as king lasted only one year 
and because much of the existing correspondence between Catherine and her daughter during 
this period deal with pleasantries and inquiries about one another‟s health. This is partially 
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understandable, since at that time, the queen of Spain would have been only fourteen or fifteen 
years old.  However, a few years into Charles IX‟s reign, Catherine‟s intended role for her eldest 
daughter within her political network is much more distinguishable.  There are essentially three 
ways one can measure how Catherine attempted to use her familial connection to the Queen of 
Spain to realize her own political desires. The first is to examine positive conciliatory measures 
made by the King of Spain to the French crown during the length of his marriage to Queen 
Élisabeth.  The second is to analyze the political issues discussed within Catherine and 
Élisabeth‟s correspondence, with the understanding that Élisabeth would then either act as an 
advocate for Catherine‟s request or as an apologist for Catherine‟s political initiatives. The third 
and final means of discerning Catherine‟s role for Élisabeth in her political network is to 
examine the requests made by Catherine for Élisabeth to intercede on Catherine‟s behalf with the 
King of Spain, especially concerning Catherine‟s unsatisfactory reaction to the spread of 
Calvinism within her realm and the rebellion of many her high-ranking Huguenot noblemen.  
 Though his reasons could possibly be attributed to his personal detestation of religious 
heresy, Philip‟s donation of military and financial aid in Spring 1562 to help suppress the 
Huguenot rebellions in the south of France is one of the first and most important examples of 
Élisabeth‟s role in the creation of a Spanish foreign policy program amendable to Catherine‟s 
interests.
31
  At the time of this offer, the Huguenots under the command of Louis I de Bourbon, 
prince of Condé had just entered the city of Orléans with 1,000-1,200 soldiers, fortifying the city 
as a base of operations against the armies of King Charles and the Queen Mother.
32
  After 
receiving notification of her son-in-law‟s offer, Catherine wrote to both Philip and her daughter 
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expressing her gratitude to her son-in-law for his “bonne grase” and likewise telling Élisabeth to 
thank Philip for his intended aid to those who wish to do evil against Catherine and her 
government.
33
  Catherine would take Philip up on his offer, and the King of Spain would donate 
six thousand Spanish and Italian troops, as well as enough money to purchase the services of 
4,000 German mercenaries, towards the eradication of religious heresy and to the maintenance of 
mother-in-law‟s regency.
34
 These Habsburg funded troops would subsequently participate on the 
side of the Royalist forces in the famous Catholic victory at Dreux in December 1562, where 
Condé would be captured and imprisoned “pour ces causes.”
35
 
Of course, the contribution of soldiers and monies made by Philip to combat the threat of 
Calvinist rebellion cannot be entirely credited to the diplomatic maneuverings of Catherine and 
Élisabeth, since three years earlier, Henri II had solicited Philip‟s assistance against the Calvinist 
uprising in Bordeaux before Philip had met his bride.
36
 However, though Philip‟s affections for 
his French wife may have not been the genesis of Spanish intervention in the French Religious 
Wars, Élisabeth was still a vital component in the diplomatic discourse between the Spanish 
crown and Catherine‟s regency on how to solve their shared problem of the expansion of 
Protestantism. For instance, Élisabeth represented Philip in an interview with Catherine in 
Southern France in 1565 to “hammer out a common policy on extirpating heresy.”
37
 Élisabeth 
likewise served as a symbol of Franco-Spanish détente during the particularly unstable years of 
Charles IX‟s minority, even after her death in 1568.  Though Élisabeth had been dead for nearly 
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a year, Philip II would again send troops, this time numbering around four thousand, to aid his 
besieged former brother and mother-in-law in 1569, during the height of the Third Religious 
War. In the same year, Philip would likewise implore his relative Emperor Ferdinand I to do all 




 However, the spread of heresy and the threat of Huguenot military insurgency was not 
the only domestic issue that Catherine sought partially to rectify through her daughter‟s 
relationship with the most formidable monarch in Europe. In a letter written to Élisabeth, dated 
March 22, 1561, Catherine indicated that she was being tormented by François de Lorraine, duke 
of Guise and his brother Charles, cardinal of Lorraine, who were spreading rumors both at court 
and abroad that questioned Catherine‟s commitment to Catholicism, accusing her of stealing the 
governance of the realm, and attempting to cast other such aspersions on Catherine‟s right to be 
regent.
39
 Catherine also indicated to her daughter that the Guise were trying to drive a wedge 
between Catherine and her easily manipulated ally, Antoine de Bourbon, informing him that 
ruling without the regent, and subsequently having all of France‟s resources at his full disposal, 
was “le seul moyen pour ravoyr la réconpanse de son royaume,” “son royaume” being Spanish-
occupied Navarre. Catherine then asked her daughter if she could persuade Philip II to return 
Spanish Navarre to Antoine de Bourbon, or at least offer him some form of compensation to 
conciliate him.
40
 Needless to say, Élisabeth was unable to convince her husband to cede a 
significant portion of Northern Spain to the king of Navarre to help alleviate his mother-in-law‟s 
political predicament.  
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 Another means in which Catherine used her eldest daughter for the aggrandizement of the 
House of Valois, and subsequently her own political influence, was through brokering marriages 
between Catherine‟s remaining unmarried children and members of both the Spanish and 
Austrian branches of the House of Habsburg. From what we can tell from existing 
correspondence, a desired match between a young Charles IX and Philip II‟s younger sister Dona 
Juana, the widow of Juan Manuel, prince of Portugal, was the first marital alliance that Catherine 
solicited Élisabeth‟s assistance to achieve. In a letter written to the bishop of Limoges in May 
1562, Catherine de‟ Medici explained to her ambassador at the Spanish court that she is 
depending on Élisabeth to “adviser d‟enfourner et mectre en termes le dict marriage” to Philip, 
and Catherine charges Limoges with relating this information to the Queen of Spain since 
Catherine feared that Élisabeth‟s letters were being read before being given to her. For reasons of 
politesse, it is quite understandable that Catherine would be wary of this particular letter falling 
into the wrong hands.  In addition to her more politically palatable reason for wanting this 
marriage, strengthening the nascent alliance between France and Spain, Catherine explained to 
Limoges that she would like to secure the marriage between Charles IX and Dona Juana as a 
safety measure in case Philip and Élisabeth remained childless and the Spanish Habsburg‟s 
possessions passed to Philip‟s sisters, Dona Maria, who would inherit Spain, and Dona Juana, 
who would receive the Spanish Netherlands and the Duchy of Milan.
41
 Though Catherine may 
have been considering this match for some time, this particular letter to Limoges was mostly 
likely in response to recent news that Don Carlos was suffering from yet another illness and that 
the death of Philip‟s heir was imminent.
42
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The fact that Élisabeth had yet to conceive after nearly three years of marriage was not 
unusual since she was seventeen at the time that the letter was written, and Catherine adamantly 
stated to Limoges that she believed Élisabeth and Philip would have children eventually.
43
 
However, regardless of Catherine‟s professed faith in Élisabeth‟s fecundity, this letter clearly 
shows that Catherine had alternative plans for Élisabeth‟s role in her political network if the 
queen of Spain failed in her primary duty: to win her husband‟s favor by producing a male heir, 
which would strengthen her position at the Spanish court, and to produce an heir that would be 
sympathetic to French interests strengthening amity between the French and Spanish kingdoms. 
If Élisabeth was able to assure the fruition of this marriage between Charles IX and Dona Juana, 
even if she remained childless, she would have been able to secure the acquisition of two 
economically lucrative and militarily beneficial territories for the French crown.  
Though unsuccessful in her attempts at arranging a marriage between Charles IX and 
Dona Juana, Charles‟s desired Spanish bride would enter a convent, Élisabeth would once again 
be called upon by Catherine to help broker a marriage between Charles IX and another female 
member of the House of Habsburg. In a letter written to the queen of Spain, dated August 24, 
1563, Catherine asked Élisabeth to inquire about her husband‟s “aupinion” of a potential 
marriage between Charles IX and Archduchess Elisabeth, the eldest daughter of the King of the 
Romans. In other words, Catherine was inquiring of her daughter whether or not the marriage 
between the Valois and the Austrian Habsburgs would negatively affect the relationship between 
the French and Spanish crowns.  Catherine also wanted her daughter to relate to Philip II that the 
French crown would not want to enter an union that would run counter to the King of Spain‟s 
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Five years later, the subject of the Spanish Queen‟s intended involvement in the marriage 
negotiations for Charles IX with one of Elisabeth‟s sisters, the Archduchess Anne, appeared once 
again in Catherine‟s correspondence. 
45
 In a letter written to Catherine from Raymond de 
Fourquevaux, Limoges‟s replacement at the Spanish court, Fourquevaux explained to Catherine 
that he had recently corresponded with the Spanish Queen, asking her to inform her husband that 
Fourquevaux would like to be received by Philip II at the monastery of Escurial, where Philip 
was temporarily residing, and to make sure that Fourquevaux found the King of Spain in good 
humor when he came to kiss hands and discuss the intended marriage alliance between the 
French crown and the Austrian Habsburgs. According to Fourquevaux, Queen Élisabeth wrote to 
Philip about the intended match, and though Fourquevaux did not say as much, it is implied that 
she had requested that Philip either help expedite the conclusion of the negotiations or make the 
Emperor more amendable to the match. Fourquevaux then received a letter from Philip, stating 
that the Emperor would soon send his brother, the Archduke Charles to France “exprez pour 
traicter le marriage.” Fourquevaux then expresses to Catherine that the Archduke Charles‟s 
voyage to France is a good sign for the realization of her marriage ambitions for her son.
46
 
 However, despite Élisabeth‟s efforts, neither the marriage itself nor the negotiations 
would be completed during Élisabeth‟s lifetime.  Catherine‟s correspondence from early 1569 
indicates that the Holy Roman Emperor was still dragging his feet in regard to the marriage 
between Charles IX, and this time, his eldest daughter the Archduchess Elisabeth. It is interesting 
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to note, however, that in these final letters concerning the conclusion of the marriage 
negotiations between the Valois and the Austrian Habsburgs, it is quite evident that Catherine is 
relying  much less on her Spanish Habsburg connections to facilitate the match with the Austrian 
Hapsburgs. In a letter to Fourquevaux, dated January 1569, Catherine explained to her 
ambassador at the Spanish court that she is depending on the cardinal of Lorraine to conclude the 
marriage negotiations. 
47 Though it could be a possibility that Catherine, in relying or the 
cardinal of Lorraine after the death of Élisabeth, was trying to build a rapport with Austrian 
Habsburgs separate from Spain, it‟s much more likely that Catherine was much less able to call 
upon Philip II for favors since the physical embodiment of the union between France and Spain 
was now dead.  
In addition to the aforementioned matches for Charles IX, Catherine also attempted to use 
her eldest daughter‟s relationship with the King of Spain to arrange an advantageous marriage 
for Catherine‟s youngest daughter, Marguerite, and to thwart the independent marriage ambitions 
of  Mary Stuart, Queen of Scots that ran counter to Catherine‟s own foreign policy designs. 
Though her youngest daughter Marguerite was only seven at the time, Catherine initiated 
negotiations with Spain concerning marriage between Marguerite and Philip II‟s heir Don Carlos 
in 1560. The King of Spain had been married twice before his union with Élisabeth de Valois, 
and Don Carlos was a product of his first marriage to Maria Manuela, princess of Portugal. In a 
letter to the bishop of Limoges, Catherine requested that her ambassador tell the queen of Spain 
that she should try and find every opportunity to discuss this matter with Philip II, while 
carefully fostering her husband‟s favor. 
48
 Other than Don Carlos‟s obvious physical and mental 
incapacities, and Marguerite‟s young age, Catherine believed that the greatest road block to the 
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marriage between Marguerite and Don Carlos was Catherine‟s newly widowed former daughter-
in-law, Mary Stuart. Though ousted from power after the death of François II, the duke of Guise 
and his younger brother the cardinal of Lorraine now sought the aggrandizement of the house of 
Lorraine‟s fortune and influence through marriage between their niece the Queen of Scots and 
the heir to the Spanish throne.  
By April 1561, it seems that Catherine had come to terms with the fact that Marguerite‟s 
age had disqualified her from being one of Don Carlos‟s potential brides. However, despite 
Élisabeth‟s inability to secure this match for her sister, Catherine still hoped that Élisabeth could 
thwart the Guise‟s similar aspirations for Mary Stuart. In a series of letters written to both the 
Spanish Queen and the bishop of Limoges in Spring 1561, the Queen mother related that the 
Guise brothers, evidently still reeling from their fall from power, had been undermining 
Catherine‟s regency.
49
 These missives seem to indicate that though Catherine was currently 
unable to nullify their political threat at home, the Queen mother wanted to ensure their house is 
not emboldened further through the marriage of their niece the queen of Scots to Don Carlos. 
Declaring that the failure of this marriage plot is necessary for the maintenance of her three her 
sons‟ personal securities, Catherine charged Limoges, in concert with Élisabeth, with the task 
doing “tout ce que vous sera possible pour romper ce coup.”
50
 
 In short, the fact that Catherine made these requests to her teenage daughter speaks 
volumes about Catherine‟s dependence on the goodwill of her son-in-law during the uncertain 
early years of her regency and how she likewise sought to obtain the support of her son-in-law 
through Philip II‟s affection for Élisabeth.  Catherine‟s eldest daughter was “beautiful” and 
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“agreeable” “honored and respected” and there was every indication that Philip adored her.
51
  
Catherine understood her precarious position as regent, and she knew that the support of her son-
in-law Philip was crucial to legitimating and prolonging her regency, as well as to ensuring the 
political security of the House of Valois.  Though she was not always successful in using Philip‟s 
affection for her daughter Élisabeth for her own political gain, Catherine was able to build a 
comparatively healthy Franco-Spanish alliance that endured even after her daughter‟s death in 
1568, which proved beneficial to both the maintenance of the realm and to the consolidation of 
her own political influence.  
 
Marguerite de Valois: Queen of France and Navarre 
 Known popularly to posterity as “La Reine Margot,” Marguerite de Valois was born on 
May 14, 1553 in the château de Saint-Germaine-en-Laye, making her seven years younger than 
her sister Élisabeth.
52
  Her contemporary, the abbé de Brantôme, described Marguerite as 
possessing a “beautiful face” resting on a “beautiful, superb, and rich” body, making her  
resemble “a goddess of heaven” as opposed to a “princess of earth.”
53
 Although Marguerite‟s 
undeniable good looks were eventually tainted by her numerous sexual indiscretions and poor 
judgment, Catherine de‟ Medici initially had high hopes for the marriage prospects of her 
youngest and most attractive daughter, and it is easy to see why.  In addition to her handsome 
features, the young Marguerite was not particularly intelligent or ambitious, and made every 
                                                          
51
 Brantôme, Illustrious Dames, 47, 45.  
52
 Éliane Viennot, Marguerite de Valois: Histoire d’une femme, histoire d’un mythe. (Paris: Grande Bibliothèque 
Payot, 1995): 22.  
53




attempt to please her domineering mother, rendering Marguerite in every respect a pliable tool 
for Catherine‟s own political gain.
54
 
As with her daughter Élisabeth, Catherine initially conceptualized Marguerite‟s primary 
function within her political network in the usual way that a monarch would seeks to utilize a 
daughter for political gain: as a means of securing a valuable foreign alliance.  While Catherine‟s 
plans to use Marguerite to consolidate her powerbase abroad would eventually be left unrealized, 
renewed tensions between Catholics and Protestants following Marguerite‟s marriage to Henri de 
Bourbon, king of Navarre left Marguerite with a new purpose in her mother‟s network. The 
subsequent St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre (August 1572) left Marguerite with a new purpose 
within Catherine‟s network: to control and assuage domestic crises. Though it is the general 
consensus among historians that Marguerite, during her tempestuous marriage with the King of 
Navarre, was more of a headache to Catherine than a valuable ally, evidence shows that, despite 
their frequent personal and political disagreements, Catherine used Marguerite both to cultivate a 
more amicable relationship with the king of Navarre, Marguerite‟s spouse and the leader of 
France‟s Huguenot population, and to help build a lasting peace between the warring Catholic 
and Huguenot parties.  
 As previously mentioned, Catherine‟s first ambition for her daughter Marguerite was to 
marry her to Don Carlos, prince of Asturias, heir to the king of Spain. Despite his “degenerate” 
and “sadistic” nature, as well as his “severe epilepsy,” Don Carlos was the most eligible bachelor 
in Christendom and marriage between Marguerite and the Spanish prince would ensure the 
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continuation of the Franco-Spanish alliance after the death of King Philip.
55
  However, there 
were numerous obstacles to this match, the first being competition from other female royals, 
most notably Catherine‟s former daughter-in-law Mary, Queen of Scots, the second being 
Marguerite‟s age,  and the third and most important being Don Carlos‟s mental instability which 
subsequently led to his confinement and death.
56
 
 Regardless, the subject of Marguerite‟s marriage to a member of the Spanish royal house 
reemerged when her sister Élisabeth died in 1568 due to complications in childbirth. Though 
Catherine‟s letters to the new French ambassador to Spain, Raymond de Fourquevaux, indicate 
that she was indeed saddened by the “malheureuse nouvelle” of the death of Élisabeth, Catherine 
lost no time filling the hole in her diplomatic network left by her eldest daughter.
57
  A little over 
a month after Élisabeth‟s death, Catherine offered Marguerite as a replacement bride for Philip II 
because she desired to preserve “la paix entre les deux roys.”
58
  However, Philip tastefully 
declined this offer and Catherine then turned her attention to the possibility of match between 
Marguerite and King Sebastian I of Portugal, with King Philip, who had apparently first 
proposed the match, acting as a mediator in the marriage negotiations.
59
 With Catherine‟s former 
son-in-law Philip acting as  the match‟s primary broker, the marriage between Marguerite and 
the king of Portugal seemed to be a  fait accompli, and Catherine even went so far as officially 
announcing their engagement to her cousin Cosimo de‟ Medici, Duke of Florence, and to Queen 
Elizabeth I of England in August 1569.
60
 Despite Catherine‟s expressed fear that Marguerite‟s 
temperament would foil the marriage arrangements, it seems that it was her former son-in-law 
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who would in fact frustrate Catherine‟s marriage ambitions for Marguerite. Now married to 
Anne of Austria, the Holy Roman Emperor‟s second eldest daughter, Philip began to stall the 
marriage negotiations in the summer and autumn of 1570, causing Catherine, his concerned 
former mother-in-law, to write numerous letters both to Philip and to her ambassador at the 
Spanish court to do all in their power to finalize the terms of the marriage.
61
 However, regardless 
of Catherine‟s diplomatic implorations to her former son-in-law, the king of Spain thwarted 
Marguerite‟s marriage to Sebastian because, in Marguerite‟s opinion, Philip did not want his 
nephew, the king of Portugal, to marry outside of Philip‟s family.
62
 Due to the childlessness of 
both Sebastian and his brother, Philip would become the king of Portugal, and as such, the first 
king in several centuries to rule over the entire Iberian Peninsula.
63
 
 It was shortly after the failed negotiations with the Portuguese King that Catherine 
earnestly considered marrying Marguerite to Marguerite‟s cousin Henri de Bourbon, son of 
Antoine de Bourbon and Jeanne d‟Albret, the king and queen of Navarre.  According to 
Marguerite‟s memoirs, it was the more politique Montmorency clan who first broached this 
subject with the Queen Mother before the Third Religious War and the subsequent Treaty of 
Saint-Germain-en-Laye had been concluded in 1570.
64
 However, the correspondence of Antoine 
de Bourbon and Ippolito II d'Este, cardinal of Ferrara respectively seem to indicate otherwise. 
From a letter written to his aunt and Guise family matriarch, Antoinette de Bourbon, the dowager 
duchesse de Guise, we know that the Jing of Navarre had offered his son and heir, Henri de 
Bourbon as a potential groom for “Madame Marguerite” as early as 1559, and from the 
correspondence of the cardinal of Ferrara to Pope Pius IV, we know that Catherine publicly 
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discussed this possibility with the king of Navarre after Don Carlos seriously injured himself 
falling down a flight of stairs in 1562.
65
 Given that Marguerite still had better marriage options 
for much of the 1560s, in addition to Don Carlos and the king of Portugal, Archduke Rudolph of 
Austria (later Emperor Rudolph II) was also considered, and that the proposed bridegroom was 
being currently raised by the staunchly Calvinist Jeanne d‟Albret miles away from the Valois 
court, it is unlikely that Catherine de‟ Medici was serious in her proposal to the king of 
Navarre.
66
 Her suggestion of a potential marriage between Marguerite and Henri de Bourbon was 
more likely a means of keeping the politically inconsistent, though decidedly influential king of 
Navarre in line with her interests. In fact, the Guise brothers used a similar tactic two years 
earlier, promising the credulous Antoine de Bourbon marriage with the Queen of Scots if he 
supported the house of Lorraine in their endeavors.
67
 
Yet, with the treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye (1570), the crown was now at peace with 
France‟s Huguenots, and a marriage between her daughter and the future king of Navarre was 
deemed a good conciliatory gesture towards “yesterday‟s enemies.”
68
 Though the Calvinist 
Jeanne d‟Albert was initially opposed to the marriage and a dispensation had to be sought, due to 
both the consanguinity of the couple and the faith of the bridegroom, Catherine was a great 
proponent of the marriage and personally petitioned Pope Gregory XIII for the dispensation.
69
 In 
addition to the obvious domestic benefits of the match, to assuage the religious conflict with the 
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realm, Catherine‟s letters also indicate that Catherine hoped that this marriage between 
Marguerite and the Huguenot Henri de Bourbon would please other Protestant powers. For 
instance, while relating the news of Marguerite‟s and Henri de Bourbon‟s impending marriage in 
letter to the English Queen Elizabeth, Catherine tells her “très chère et très aimée bonne sœur et 
cousine” that Catherine is certain that the English Queen is hearing this news with great 
pleasure.
70
 In addition to the obvious pleasure that the Protestant queen of England would take in 
learning of this conciliatory gesture between the French crown and its Huguenots, Catherine may 
have hoped that the betrothal of Marguerite to Henri de Bourbon would encourage the possibility 
of another marriage between the house of Valois and another Protestant state, namely a union 
between Queen Elizabeth I of England and the duke of Alençon.   
 The wedding of Marguerite de Valois and Henri de Bourbon, now king of Navarre, took 
place in Paris on August 18, 1572, and what happened next is well known.  It is not the objective 
of this thesis to determine Catherine de‟ Medici‟s role in the St. Bartholomew‟s Day Massacre, 
but its mention is essential to explain the evolving role of Marguerite within Catherine‟s female 
political network.  With her new son-in-law confined in Paris, his political and religious threat 
nullified, Catherine asked Marguerite if she was desirous for the dissolution of her marriage to 
Henri de Bourbon.  Marguerite declined this offer, Catherine surprisingly conceded to her 
request, and Marguerite remained married to Henri de Bourbon until after Catherine‟s death.
71
 
If Catherine de‟ Medici had hoped that with the continuation of her daughter‟s marriage 
to Henri de Bourbon she would be able to use Marguerite to track the political movements of 
Henri de Bourbon, she was initially right in her assumptions. When the royal court accompanied 
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Henri de Valois, duke of Anjou and king-elect of Poland, to Beaune to wish him farewell before 
departing for his new kingdom, Marguerite‟s husband and youngest brother, the perpetually 
malcontent François de Valois, duke of Alençon, made plans to break away from the royal 
entourage and connect with Huguenot troops on their return to Paris.  Upon hearing of these 
preparations, Marguerite dutifully informed King Charles and Catherine of her husband‟s and 
brother‟s schemes, and the two men were prevented from joining the Huguenots.
72
 
Of course, Marguerite would not always be so keen to offer information concerning 
Navarre and Alençon to her mother, and Marguerite‟s conduct would not always be so politically 
beneficial to Catherine.  In September 1575, the duke of Alençon and the king of Navarre were 
finally successful in their attempts to escape from the Valois court, and rather than inform her 
mother and King Henri III of their intentions (King Charles had since died) Marguerite 
concealed their plans for departure. 
73
 In her memoirs, Marguerite describes how Alençon waited 
until dusk, and covering the lower half of his face, walked on foot to the gate St. Honoré where 
he was met a coach that took him out of Paris. When asked by her mother and brother, King 
Henri III why Alençon has not supped with them that evening, Marguerite feigned ignorance for 
the reason of his absence.
74
 Needless to say, Catherine would eventually become aware of 
Marguerite‟s complicity in both Navarre‟s and Alençon‟s respective escapes. After writing a 
rather long letter to her son, King Henri III, on Alençon‟s flight, Catherine adds the ominous 
post-script “Je ayscrips a vostre seur, afin d‟aduisir le marche.”
75
 
Despite Marguerite‟s previous dissimulation in regards to the escape of her husband and 
brother, Catherine de‟ Medici was nonetheless quite desirous to have her daughter reunited with 
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the king of Navarre at his court at Nérac, most likely since Marguerite‟s position as queen of 
Navarre was obviously of  very little  use to her mother when separated from her husband.
76
 
Therefore, with Catherine accompanying her, Marguerite made her way to southern France 
where she reunited with her husband at Castéras in September 1578. With the king and queen of 
Navarre finally reunited, Catherine lost no time in using the relationship between her daughter 
and the leader of the Huguenot party to benefit her and the realm. In a letter to Henri III 
recounting the happenings of the gathering at Castéras, Catherine explains to her favorite son 
that she used this meeting to impress upon the king of Navarre the French crown‟s desire for 
peace with its Huguenot subjects and likewise to express Henri III‟s perfect love for his Bourbon 
cousin, whom he viewed as his true heir after the duke of Alençon.
77
 It seems that while 
Catherine was conveying her son‟s newfound amity for the king of Navarre, Marguerite was 
likewise doing her part to facilitate peace between Henri III and France‟s Huguenot population, 
by primarily echoing the sentiments already made by her mother to her husband.
78
 As one of his 
former captors, Catherine probably realized that the king of Navarre would be reluctant to trust 
the Queen mother and her overtures of peace, therefore, Catherine more than likely solicited 
Marguerite to act as Catherine‟s advocate in these matters, since as both his wife and ally during 
his confinement at the Valois court, Navarre would have been more inclined to listen to 
Marguerite.  
Two months following Marguerite‟s and Henri‟s reunion at Castéras, Catherine 
accompanied her daughter to Henri de Bourbon‟s court at Nérac where preparations were 
underway for a conference between Protestant leaders and the French crown, with Catherine 
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acting on Henri III‟s behalf.
79
 The presence of Catherine‟s attractive ladies-in-waiting would 
eventually cause a slight rift between Navarre and Marguerite. Still, the king and queen of 
Navarre seemed to be on good terms throughout the duration of the conference, and Catherine 
was predictably pleased with their amicable reunion, since it allowed Catherine to influence her 
son-in-law through his amity with Marguerite. One of the first issues that Catherine sought to 
manipulate through the intervention of Marguerite was the location of the conference itself. With 
her husband apparently suffering from a migraine, Marguerite departed from the Port-Saincte-
Marye, where she and Catherine were residing, for Nérac, where the king of Navarre was 
supposed to be convalescing. Though Marguerite apparently found her husband in good health, 
Catherine told her daughter that she should remonstrate with the king of Navarre for choosing 
Nérac as the conference site, since its position between both a high mountain and a river 
rendered those residing there more susceptible to ailments. Catherine then enlisted Marguerite to 
persuade the king of Navarre to move the conference to Villeneuve. 
80
 Despite Catherine‟s 
assertions over her  son-in-law‟s health, it is more likely that she was reluctant enter the rabidly 
Protestant Nérac, fearing imprisonment by the king of Navarre once she had entered the city, or 
Huguenot reprisals taken against her for the St. Bartholomew‟s Day massacre.  
Despite Marguerite‟s evident failure to move the location of the conference to 
Villeneuve, Marguerite would still play an important diplomatic and symbolic role in the course 
of the conference, as well as in the maintenance of peace in the years following the conference at 
Nérac. In a letter written to Marguerite, dated August 1579, Catherine implores Marguerite to not 
lose the “courage et fault que usiez de l‟auctorité de ce que vous estes et que vous envoiez 
quelqu‟un catholique.” She reminds her daughter that she is the Catholic sister of the king of 
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France, and as such, she must actively desire and seek the conservation of all good Catholic 
subjects within the kingdom. Therefore, Catherine entreats her daughter to do all in her power to 
preserve the tenuous peace established at Nérac, which is beginning to unravel. Catherine then 
indicates to Marguerite that a more permanent peace may be secured if the king of Navarre 
agreed to visit Henri III, assuring her daughter that if Henri de Bourbon paid a visit to the Valois 
court, he would be received like a true officer of the crown and servant of the king. However, if 
the war recommences, it will be to no one‟s benefit except for France‟s “ennemis,” meaning 
mostly likely the Spanish.
81
 
In an attempt to build a more lasting peace between the French King Henri III and the 
king of Navarre, Catherine likewise enlisted Marguerite‟s help in severing the relationship 
between the king of Navarre and his hotheaded and rabidly Calvinist cousin Henri de Bourbon, 
prince de Condé.  In a letter to Henriette de Clèves, Duchess of Nevers, Catherine indicates that 
she had been recently told that the prince of Condé, who was much less willing to compromise 
with the Valois, had sought out the king of Navarre. Though Catherine does not specifically state 
what her suspicions are of why this meeting occurred, Catherine nonetheless relates to the 
duchess of Nevers that she has written to Marguerite asking her break up the two Bourbon 
cousins. 
82
 It is impossible, of course,  to measure what affect, if any, Marguerite had on the 
relationship between her husband the king of Navarre and the prince de Condé, it seems that 
Catherine was, at least until 1582, pleased with Marguerite‟s conduct as Queen of Navarre, as 
well as Marguerite‟s efforts on behalf of the French crown. 
83
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Despite the evident trust that Catherine placed in Marguerite, Catherine‟s ambitions for 
her youngest daughter would be soon disappointed. Due to political and religious disagreements, 
as well as infidelities on both sides, Marguerite and her husband were frequently at odds around 
two years after their reunion. As a result, after an embarrassing false pregnancy in late 1581, 
Marguerite took the opportunity to rejoin her mother at the Valois court.
84
 Upon her return to 
Paris, Marguerite‟s behavior became increasingly erratic and morally dissolute. In addition to 
publicly insulting King Henri III and openly keeping lovers, Marguerite was suspected by 
Catherine of attempting to turn Catherine‟s youngest son, François, now duc d‟Anjou, against 
Henri III. 
85
 Though her husband was little inclined to have Marguerite returned to him, 
Marguerite was ousted from her brother‟s court in Paris in 1583, and with some political 
scolding from Catherine and King Henri III, the king of Navarre allowed Marguerite to return to 
him at Nérac.
86
 Neglected by the king of Navarre and rendered politically insignificant, 
Marguerite would leave her husband‟s court in Nérac for Agen, where she established a 
government and made preparations for the fortification of the city with the aid of “beaucoup de 
jans dhonneur,” much to annoyance of husband, brother and mother.
87
 Despite Marguerite‟s 
seemingly inexcusable behavior, Catherine nonetheless wrote numerous letters to Marguerite, 
counseling her to make better decisions, while still seeking to reconcile her rebellious daughter 
with her philandering husband. However, by 1586, it was evident to both Catherine and Henri III 
that Marguerite‟s behavior had rendered her reputation and political use beyond saving, and 
Marguerite was imprisoned by her brother in the château d‟Usson, where she remained until the 
succession of her husband Henri IV (1589-1610) to the French throne.  
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Yet, despite these efforts on her mother‟s behalf, it is the general belief among historians 
that Marguerite de Valois was of more of a headache and an ally to her mother. Of course, 
Marguerite did continually provide Catherine de‟ Medici with so many “nouveaux ennuix” 
during Catherine‟s lifetime. However, it is important to remember that Catherine never gave up 
hope that Marguerite, as Queen of Navarre, would act in a capacity that was beneficial to the 
designs of both Catherine and her favorite son Henri III, and as a result, at least for a few years, 
Catherine‟s patience with Marguerite did prove beneficial to Catherine‟s political agenda.
88
 In 
addition to the conferences at Nérac, where Catherine was able to establish some semblance of 
accord between Huguenot nobles led by the Kkng of Navarre and the French crown, Catherine‟s 
letters indicate that the Catholic Marguerite served as a symbol for the potential of “paix” 
between the warring and Huguenot and Catholic parties.
89
 During her first years at her husband‟s 
court, Marguerite likewise served as an intermediary between her mother and brother and the 
king of Navarre.  
As indicated by this chapter, Catherine‟s eldest and youngest daughters possessed an 
important place within Catherine‟s domestic and foreign policy designs. In addition to acting as 
both her advocate and apologist at the Spanish court, Catherine enlisted her daughter Élisabeth to 
help secure the dynastic legacy of the house of Valois by helping to obtain advantageous 
marriages for her siblings. In the case of Marguerite, Catherine primarily hoped that her youngest 
daughter would assuage relations with the French Huguenot population. Though both 
Marguerite‟s poor choices and bouts of rebelliousness certainly caused Catherine many political 
headaches in the last decades of her life, Marguerite did in some instances prove useful to 
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Catherine political designs. In short, Catherine astutely realized her daughters had the potential 
to be an important piece in the game of both international and domestic politics, and as a result 
of her creation of this female kinship-based political system, she was often able to make 






































Chapter 2: Catherine‟s daughters-in-law 
 
 Like her daughters Élisabeth and Marguerite, Catherine also sought to incorporate other 
potentially influential female relatives, most notably her daughters-in-law, Mary Stuart, Queen of 
Scots, Elisabeth of Austria, and Louise of Lorraine-Vaudémont, into her political network for the 
purposes of simultaneously solidifying foreign alliances and moderating domestic politics. 
However, also similar to the cases of the queens of Spain and Navarre, Catherine‟s attempts to 
capitalize on her relationship with her daughters-in-law often produced inconsistent or 
unsuccessful results. As shown in the previous chapter, Catherine‟s daughters Élisabeth and 
Marguerite possessed a distinguishable role within Catherine‟s network, and frequently, their 
position within that network was a great benefit to the Queen mother. Though they had married 
into other royal houses, it is evident from Catherine‟s letters that, as both Catherine‟s daughters 
and the sisters of the king of France, Élisabeth and Marguerite were expected by the Queen 
mother to represent the interests of France and the House of Valois in their interactions with their 
royal spouses, even if those interests may have been incongruous with the policies previously 
embraced by their husband‟s respective governments.  
One would assume that the high pedigree of Catherine‟s daughters-in-law, as well as the 
political influence of their families, would have allowed Mary Stuart, Elisabeth of Austria, and to 
a lesser extent Louise de Lorraine-Vaudémont, to assume a diplomatic function similar to those 
adopted by Catherine‟s daughters. Of course, there were additional factors that prevented these 
French consorts from establishing a strong political footing at the Valois court, however, it was 
their simultaneous existence within two or more political networks, particularly in the case of 
Mary Stuart and Louise de Lorraine-Vaudémont, that prevented Catherine from effectively 




one of this chapter‟s main purposes is to study how the overlap of family-oriented political 
networks may have inhibited the diplomatic effectiveness of Mary Stuart, Elisabeth of Austria 
and Louise de Lorraine-Vaudémont for Catherine‟s political designs, this section on Catherine‟s 
daughters-in-law will be less of a study on how members of Catherine‟s network impacted 
sixteenth-century French politics. Instead, it will mainly provide a case study on how Catherine 
sought and failed to incorporate influential women within her political system.  
 
 
Mary Stuart, Queen of Scots 
 
The only surviving child of James V of Scotland and his French consort Marie de Guise, 
Mary Stuart was born December 8, 1542 and succeeded to the throne six days later with the 
death of her father after a disastrous defeat of the Scottish army at Solway Moss.
90
 Following the 
death of King James, Mary‟s cousin and heir, James Hamilton, earl of Arran assumed control of 
the governance of the realm. Threatened by the entrance of additional English soldiers across the 
southern border, Arran began negotiations with Henri II for the marriage of the young Queen of 
Scots to Henri II‟s and Catherine de‟ Medici‟s eldest son, the dauphin François, with the 
understanding that the French king would send French troops to help expel the English from the 
Scottish kingdom. Once the dispatched French army had finally recaptured some militarily 
strategic towns from the English, the marriage contract was ratified, and the young Scottish 
Queen was sent to the French court in 1548 to be raised with her future husband, as her mother, 
Marie de Guise, wrestled away the reins of power in Scotland from the Earl of Arran.
91
 
At the French court, Mary Stuart was raised alongside Catherine‟s daughters, and like the 
three Valois princesses, her education was monitored by Henri II‟s maitresse en titre Diane de 
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 It would be another decade before the young Queen of Scots would marry the 
dauphin, and though their marriage would be cut short by François‟s ill-health, the two evidently 
spent their short union “in great love and pleasant concord.”
93
 However, despite the tender 
affection that her son François was supposed to have borne towards his Scottish wife, 
Catherine‟s personal and political dislike of Mary Stuart was well known both in France and in 
foreign courts, culminating in Mary‟s rather unceremonious ejection from France by Catherine 
two years after the death of François II. Though political necessity would require the 
reestablishment of cordial diplomatic relations between the two women, this latent animosity 
which found its naissance during Mary‟s adolescence in France would unfavorably taint 
Catherine‟s relationship with the Queen of Scots for the duration of Mary‟s reign. 
So, how did the relationship between Catherine and her teenage daughter-in-law 
deteriorate to the extent that Catherine would allow her personal sentiments potentially to 
jeopardize her government‟s rapport with the Scottish Queen, who, in addition to ruling over 
France‟s longest ally, also had a strong chance of succeeding to the throne of England? First, 
Mary‟s own temperament and arrogance played a significant role in Catherine‟s ire. While Henri 
II was still alive, and Catherine subordinate to her husband‟s mistress, Mary probably learned to 
view Catherine with condescension, due to both Catherine‟s comparatively common lineage and 
unimportant status at the Valois court, from Diane de Poitiers herself.
94
 In that vein, Mary was 
supposed to have famously remarked to the Queen mother, during the reign of François II, that 
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Catherine would “never be anything but a merchant‟s daughter,” though this comment may have 
come about more at the suggestion of the cardinal of Lorraine as opposed to Diane de Poitiers.
95
 
Yet, despite any personal resentment that may have arisen from these slights, Catherine 
did possess some legitimate political justifications for her treatment of Mary after the death of 
François II. In addition to the authority and prestige accompanying her position as Queen of 
Scots, Mary Stuart, through her mother, was a key member of one of the most economically 
dominant and politically influential noble dynasties to emerge in Europe during the early modern 
period, the cadet branch of the house of Lorraine, the house of Guise. Since the founding of the 
house of Guise in France during the mid-1520s, the duke of Guise and his male relatives had 
become some of the greatest landed magnates in the realm, with powerbases in Normandy, 
Picardy, and Champagne and had established an “ecclesiastical empire” of sorts, with the 
house‟s younger sons acting as some of the kingdom‟s most prominent and richest prelates.
96
 
More importantly however, the duke of Guise and his younger brother the cardinal of Lorraine, 
were among the most political influential men at court at the time of Henri II‟s death in 1559, 
with their extensive clientage network slowly undermining the position of influential 
Montmorency and Bourbon clans. Though Guise historian Stuart Carroll has recently asserted 
that the Queen mother and the Guise brothers initially had a cordial and symbiotic relationship, 
because the Guise “accorded Catherine with the respect she craved” while Diane de Poitiers was 
still a fixture at court, a salient rivalry had formed between the Guise and the Queen mother by 
the end of François II‟s reign.
97
 Upon François II‟s accession to the throne, the Guise brothers 
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were partially able to assume many governmental powers, and thwart Catherine‟s own 
ambitions, on the pretext that they were related to François II‟s consort.  When François II died, 
the Guise likewise used the widowed Mary Stuart to control Catherine‟s sometime ally Antoine 




Another cause of the antagonism between Catherine and Mary appears to have been 
Mary‟s marriage prospects to Don Carlos, son of Philip II and heir to the Spanish crown, since as 
stated earlier in this essay, Catherine de‟ Medici‟s great ambition was to marry her daughter 
Marguerite to Don Carlos.
99
 Despite Guise‟s admission in January 1561 that the King of Spain 
was probably not willing to betroth Don Carlos to the Queen of Scots, due to Philip‟s heir‟s ill-
health, Catherine‟s frantic letters to Queen Élisabeth and the bishop of Limoges in the spring and 
summer of that same year indicate that Catherine not only believed that Marguerite was still a 
contender for Don Carlos‟s hand, but also that Mary Stuart would still be viewed as an 
advantageous alternative to the French princess.
100
 Mary‟s uncle, the cardinal of Lorraine, had at 
one time spoken to Catherine about arranging a betrothal between the Queen of Scots and the 
Austrian Archduke Charles.
101
 Therefore, with the intention of directing Mary away from the 
Spanish prize, Catherine tried to encourage a marriage between Mary and youngest son of 
Ferdinand I, Holy Roman Emperor in April 1561.
102
 However, as previously indicated, the 
Queen of Scots would marry neither Don Carlos nor the Archduke Charles. Mary was induced 
by Catherine to leave the French court for her native Scotland in August 1561, leaving behind 
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her lucrative possessions in France while being refused assurances of safe passage from 
Elizabeth I of England.
103
 
However, it seems that once Mary had established herself in Edinburgh, and had been 
physically distanced from her ambitious Guise relatives, Catherine was more inclined to 
reestablish a friendly rapport with her former daughter-in-law, who was now a reigning head of 
state. Though the threat to Marguerite‟s marriage to Don Carlos had not been entirely removed, 
Catherine made concentrated steps at rebuilding her relationship with the Queen of Scots almost 
immediately after Mary return to Scotland. In late December 1562, Thomas Randolph, the 
English ambassador the Scottish court, notes in his correspondence to Secretary of State William 
Cecil that the Mary had received letters from Catherine “„with moe gentle words then ever she 
dyd wryte before.‟” Aware of previous animosity existing between the Queen mother and the 
Queen of Scots before Mary‟s departure, Randolph could only surmise that Catherine was now 
attempting to “„courriethe favour‟” with her former daughter-in-law.
104
 
Less than a year later, in one of his reports to Cecil, Randolph relates the contents of 
another letter written to the Queen of Scots by the Queen mother. According to Randolph, 
Catherine, with this letter, related news on the present “discords” within France, and likewise 
implored her daughter-in-law to remember the “„frendeshippe and olde alliance betwene the two 
realms she is bound,‟” in an obvious reference to the centuries-old Auld Alliance. The Queen of 
Scots was apparently unmoved by her mother-in-law‟s manifestations of friendship, commenting 
to the English ambassador that she did not know how “this new kindness came about,” and that 
as far as Mary was concerned, the friendship of queen of England “may stand her more in her 
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stead” than that of her “„good mother‟ in France.” Mary then expressed her doubts to Randolph 
about Catherine‟s ability to successfully rule France alone during the present troubles.
105
 
Though Catherine‟s treatment of Mary during her residence in France was a major factor 
in why Queen of Scots responded to the queen regent‟s overtures with such cynicism, 
Catherine‟s souring relationship with the cardinal of Lorraine may have likewise negatively 
colored Mary‟s opinion of the Queen mother. In his correspondence to Cecil, Randolph mades 
mention of how Mary had taken “some despite against the Queen Dowager” for Catherine‟s 
“opinion” of the cardinal of Lorraine.
106
 Throughout the duration of Mary‟s reign, it seems that 
the cardinal was constant source of moral support and political advice for the Scottish Queen, 
and despite Catherine‟s evident desire to “keep up  appearances” with Mary‟s uncle, it was well 
known that Catherine despised “[the cardinal of] Lorraine as much as any man alive.
107
 
It was not until around 1565, after Mary had entered into her disastrous union with her 
cousin Henry Stuart, Lord Darnley and effectively alienated her Protestant nobility with attempts 
at the restitution of Catholicism in Scotland, that Mary began to positively receive and 
reciprocate those overtures made by Catherine and her son Charles IX. For instance, a few 
months after Mary‟s Protestant noblemen, led by Mary‟s bastard half-brother, James Stewart, 
earl of Moray, had declared open rebellion against the Scottish Queen‟s authority, Catherine and 
Charles sent the seasoned diplomat Michel de Castelnau, sieur de la Mauvissière to the Scottish 
court for the purpose of relaying Catherine‟s proposed “remedies for the troubles in [Mary‟s]  
realm.”
108
 Catherine and her regency government would then continue to support the Queen of 
Scots, if only diplomatically, through the duration of this rebellion. Once Mary had safely 
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returned from Sterling to Edinburgh after the suppression of this upheaval, the Scottish Queen 
wrote to King Charles, thanking him for the goodwill that he and the Queen mother borne 
towards Mary “en ce tamps de nos si grandes afferes.”
109
 As Catherine was repairing her 
relationship with the Queen of Scots, the Queen mother likewise reached out to other members 
of the Guise clan. Upon hearing of the birth of Mary‟s son James in 1566, Catherine wrote a 
letter to Anne d‟Este, duchess of Guise, stating that she could not be happier if Mary had been 
her “proper fille.”
110
 In short, despite the initial mutual distrust between Catherine and Mary 
Stuart, Catherine was, at least in the last years of Mary‟s reign, doing quite well at incorporating 
Mary within her extensive diplomatic network, despite Mary‟s conflicting loyalties to 
Catherine‟s political enemies, the Guise.  
However, regardless of Catherine‟s initial victories at the building of healthy rapport 
between the two queens, Mary Stuart would not reign in Scotland for much longer. Though Mary 
appeared to be reconciling with her estranged husband Lord Darnley, Mary‟s bellicose and 
potentially syphilitic consort was found strangled to death, most likely at the behest of Mary, in 
February 1567. Though both Catherine and Queen Elizabeth of England demanded that Mary 
seek out and punish Lord Darnley‟s murderers, a few months after Darnley‟s murder, Mary 
married James Hepburn, earl of Bothwell, who “public fame [had] charged with the murder” of 
Lord Darnley.
111
 Popular speculation held that Mary and Bothwell were not the only prominent 
conspirators in the demise of Lord Darnley. Even Don Francisco de Alava, the Spanish 
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ambassador to the French court, wrote to King Philip that it was “Reyna (Catherine) y de Escocia 
fueron participes en la muerte de aquel Rey.”
112
 
Regardless of Catherine‟s supposed involvement in Lord Darnley‟s death, Mary‟s 
Protestant lords, disgusted by recent events and their Catholic queen‟s political ineptitude, 
imprisoned Mary in June 1567, in the reputedly “impregnable” castle of Loch Leven, while 
taking control of the town and castle of Sterling, where Mary‟s son Prince James was in 
residence.
113
 Mary would eventually escape her Scottish prison and crossed over the southern 
border into England, where she hoped that her cousin the queen of England would give her 
refuge from her Protestant nobleman and subsequently help her be restored to the throne. It 
seems that Catherine shared the same desires as Mary. Shortly after Mary‟s arrival in England, 
the Queen mother wrote to Queen Elizabeth, praying that Elizabeth “afford all the aid [Mary] 
needs to restore her to her liberty and authority.”
114
 Little would Catherine know, that this letter 
would be the beginning of nearly two decade diplomatic struggle that the Queen mother would 
wage in an attempt to emancipate her former daughter-in-law, and would-be political ally, from 
her captivity in England.  
It became evident to both Catherine and Charles IX, that the English Queen had little 
intention of setting the Queen of Scots at her liberty in the fall and winter of 1568. In letters 
written to both the French King and the Queen mother, the French ambassador to the English 
court, Bertrand de Salignac de la Mothe-Fénélon, indicated that rather than releasing the Scottish 
Queen, Elizabeth was contemplating moving Mary further to the center of England from her 
location in the Castle of Bolton in Yorkshire, since there was fear that Catholic subjects in that 
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part of the country might attempt a rebellion on Mary‟s behalf.
115
 La Mothe-Fénélon then related 
in his letter to the Queen mother that “qu‟on mèneles afferes de la Royne d‟Escoce avec tant 




Despite the longevity of Mary‟s imprisonment, the tactics used by Mary‟s French 
relatives to obtain her release, and likewise Queen Elizabeth‟s reaction to these ploys, seemed to 
follow an unvarying pattern for the nearly twenty years that Mary Queen of Scots was a captive 
of the  English Queen. Of course, the frequency of the letters written by Catherine and her 
respective son‟s governments to Queen Elizabeth on the subject of Mary‟s liberation certainly 
oscillated in those two decades; however, the content of much of these letters remained the same. 
Either the Queen mother, or Charles IX or Henri III, depending on the year, would personally 
write to Elizabeth asking for the “honest and favorable” treatment of the Queen of Scots and 
requesting that Mary Stuart be “restored to her Realm with Authority due to her,” or the French 
crown would have their ambassador at the English court express the same sentiments in a letter 
or in an audience with the English Queen.
117
 Depending on her mood, Elizabeth would then 
thank Catherine and her government for their concern for Mary‟s person, and go on to assert that 
she would do all in her power to restore Mary to her proper dignity. Alternatively, more 
frequently in the later years of Mary‟s imprisonment, the Queen of England would retort that 
Mary had been under a “noxious influence of some baleful planet” and that Scottish Queen had 
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brought her present troubles on herself.
118
 Regardless of Catherine‟s efforts, Mary Stuart would 
remain in England in until 1588. After Mary‟s complicity in a failed plot to overthrow Elizabeth 
was exposed, the English Queen finally executed her Scottish cousin much to the outrage of 
Catholic Europe.  
Despite Catherine‟s evident failure to incorporate Mary Stuart into her political network, 
it is important to note that, regardless of Scottish Queen‟s eventual fate, there were legitimate 
indications that Catherine‟s aid and involvement in Mary‟s cause might have exponentially 
improved the diplomatic position of the French crown, when there was internal religious turmoil 
at home. Some of these better known reasons can be found in memorandum entitled, the “Affairs 
of Scotland,” which was written by Elizabeth of England‟s Secretary of State Lord Burghley 
speculated as to some of these reasons why the French King Charles IX, and likewise Catherine, 
since the Queen mother ruled for and with her young son for the majority of his reign, sought the 
delivery of Mary Stuart. In spite of Cecil‟s obvious political biases, his assessment of French 
crown‟s motivations appears to be politically sound. Though Charles was evidently not fond of 
the Scottish Queen, Cecil believed that one of the reasons why the French King took up Mary‟s 
cause was because Charles IX did not want his reputation to be damaged for seemingly 
abandoning his dead brother‟s wife.
119
 According to Cecil, the French crown also feared that 
Mary‟s overthrow by her subjects might set a dangerous precedent that Charles‟ own subjects 
would be tempted to follow.  Cecil also speculated that, in addition to maintaining the centuries-
old Auld Alliance, the French crown also sought to appease the perpetually troublesome house of 
Guise. The final reason that Cecil gave for the Valois support of Mary during this time, and the 
one that he emphasized the most, deals with the potential interference of the king of Spain. In 
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Cecil‟s opinion, the French King, and one can assume the Queen mother as well, feared that if 
Philip were successful at helping Mary Stuart regain her throne, the crown of Spain and the 
crown of Scotland would be firmly knit in amity to the detriment of French interests.
120
 
Of course, there are addition reasons that Catherine and her sons Charles IX, and then 
Henri III, would have had for supporting the Queen of Scots in her endeavors, which Cecil 
would have neglected to go into detail about in a memorandum that would have been presented 
to either Queen Elizabeth or her Privy Council.  Despite Catherine‟s numerous attempts to marry 
her youngest sons to the English Queen, relations with Elizabeth were never completely cordial. 
Even before the St. Bartholomew‟s Day, which strained relations between the French crown and 
Protestant England, Catherine received reports from La Mothe-Fénélon recounting the 
“mauvaises deportements dont [Elizabeth] et ses subjectz avoient uzé contre” Catherine and 
Charles.
121
 Therefore, Catherine may have been seeking the restitution to the throne of a 
potential ally against Elizabeth, should the situation arise, in addition to building a healthy 
rapport with Catholic Europe‟s preferred candidate for the English throne.  
In spite of the great diplomatic potential that the Scottish Queen could have had in 
conjunction with Catherine‟s interests, the case of Mary Stuart, Queen of Scots is perhaps the 
most salient example of the weaknesses of Catherine‟s political network.  In the years prior to 
Mary‟s return to Scotland, both Catherine‟s personal sentiments towards the young Queen of 
Scots as well as Mary‟s conflicting loyalties to Catherine‟s enemies, the house of Guise, 
prevented Catherine from seizing the opportunity to incorporate the monarch of France‟s oldest 
ally within her political sphere. Also, during the first years after Mary‟s return, the Queen of 
Scots involvement within the “Guise affinity” likewise precluded Catherine‟s former daughter-
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in-law‟s absorption within Catherine‟s network. Then, when Mary Stuart was removed from the 
throne and imprisoned, she was of little use to Catherine because she had neither military 
strength nor political clout.  All the Queen of Scots possessed was a popular religious following, 
and the tenuous support of Catholic monarchs who were not incensed enough about her 
predicament to go to war with England.  Of course, Catherine cannot be blamed for her desire to 
maintain a relationship with her former daughter-in-law. As previously mentioned, Catherine had 
numerous incentives for advocating the release of the Queen of Scots. Therefore, Catherine 
should not be censured for not having realized that, as Queen Elizabeth of England so eloquently 




Elisabeth of Austria 
Though Catherine de‟ Medici had little input in the betrothal of her eldest son François to 
the Queen of Scots in the 1548, Catherine‟s position as Queen regent for the large part of the 
1560s ensured that she would have an integral role in the brokering of her second son Charles‟s 
marriage. Charles, as previously mentioned, married Elisabeth of Austria, the second eldest 
daughter of the Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian II in November 1570. Born on July 5, 1554, 
the “beautiful” and “agreeable” Elisabeth of Austria may have not been the favorite daughter of 
the Emperor Maximilian, but the young archduchess, along with her elder sister Anne, were two 
of the most sought after young brides in Europe at the time as well as the first female royals 
whom Catherine pursued in earnest on behalf of her young son.
123
 However, regardless of her 
positive personal attributes, as well as her relation to one of the most powerful monarchs in 
Europe at the time, it seems that Catherine‟s acquisition of Elisabeth for her young son yielded 
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little substantial gains for the French crown in the way of foreign policy. Therefore, like the 
previous section on Mary, Queen of Scots, this section concerning Elisabeth of Austria will 
likewise seek to examine why Catherine sought to incorporate this particular royal female into 
her network, and how despite her initial intentions and best efforts, Catherine was unable to 
effectively utilize her Austrian daughter-in-law to her advantage.   
Despite the French Queen mother‟s later enthusiasm for the union, it seems that during 
the summer of 1568, both Emperor Maximilian, and oddly enough Catherine, hoped for another 
match for the Archduchess Elisabeth. In a letter written to Catherine from Fourquevaux, the 
French ambassador to the Spanish court indicates that Maximilian was close to sending the 
Archduchess Elisabeth to the Portuguese court, so that she may marry King Sebastian. Rather 
than expecting the Queen mother to be distressed at this news, Fourquevaux hints that this was 
what Catherine desired at the time. Evidently when the letter was written, Catherine hoped for a 
marriage between Marguerite and the Archduke Rudolf, who though not yet officially elected, 
was going to be the next Holy Roman Emperor. Though not implicitly stated, Fourquevaux‟s 
letter suggests that perhaps the Emperor did not favor a double alliance between his house and 
France, and since Elisabeth was set to be the queen of Portugal, taking her out of the running for 
Charles IX‟s bride, Catherine may have hoped that the more desired match between Marguerite 
and Rudolf could now come into fruition. Evidently, Catherine found it more politically 
advantageous to have her daughter be the Holy Roman Empress, than have her daughter-in-law 
be the issue of the Holy Roman Emperor.
124
 
It seems that by January 1569 Catherine was no longer desirous to see the Archduchess 
Elisabeth married to the king of Portugal. Apparently abandoning her hope for a union between 
Marguerite and the Archduke Rudolf, Catherine now sought, as mentioned in the previous 
                                                          
124




chapter, to marry Marguerite to King Sebastian. However, instead of seeking Elisabeth as a bride 
for her son, Catherine instead pursued Elisabeth‟s sister Anne for King Charles.
125
 The eldest and 
favorite daughter of the Emperor, it understandable the Catherine turned her intention to the 
Archduchess Anne, since the Emperor‟s preference for his eldest daughter would have 
undoubtedly better benefited the maintenance of a stable relationship between the Valois and the 
Austrian Habsburgs. However, regardless of Catherine‟s intentions, Fourquevaux wrote to 
Catherine explaining not only that it appeared likely that the King of Portugal would marry the 
Archduchess Elisabeth, but that the newly widowed King Philip of Spain seemed inclined to 
marry the Archduchess Anne, and nearly a year later, Philip did just that.
126
 
Yet, fortunately for Catherine, the loss of Anne to her former son-in-law Philip was 
partially mollified by the acquisition of Elisabeth for Charles. The marriage itself took place on 
November 26, 1570, and during the wedding ceremony it was Catherine who took Elisabeth‟s 
hands and placed them between those of King Charles. Though Catherine had initially been 
disappointed at losing Anne to King Philip, it appears that Catherine was actually encouraged by 




During her short tenure as Charles IX‟s consort, Queen Elisabeth became loved and 
respected for her pious and compassionate character and quickly acquired the respect of the 
people. In short, despite the reputedly debaucherous character of the Valois court during the 
period, Elisabeth, it seems, remained “toujours irreproachable.”
128
 However, unfortunately for 
Elisabeth‟s mother-in-law, being loved and respected by the French people is not the same thing 
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as being politically influential or useful to the French crown. Though Elisabeth became pregnant 
shortly after her marriage to King Charles, and subsequently gave birth to a daughter, Marie-




In addition to failing in her principal duty to provide the realm with a male heir, Elisabeth 
was likewise unable to establish a strong political footing at the Valois court.  Elisabeth never 
mastered the French language; instead she spoke Spanish, and despite being respected by the 
courtiers, her reserved manner often caused her to be isolated in France. The evidence also seems 
to indicate that she exercised comparatively little influence over her father the emperor or her 
Habsburg relatives.  
 When Catherine sent diplomatic missives to king of Spain or Navarre, the Queen mother 
would often refer to or inquire after her daughters, indicating that Élisabeth and Marguerite were 
supposed to serve as physical reminders of a diplomatic union between the French crown and the 
two respective kingdoms. Yet, in the correspondence between Catherine and both the emperor 
and the queen of Spain, who was Elisabeth‟s sister, the virtuous and pious consort of Charles IX 
is rarely mentioned. Of course, surviving correspondence between the Catherine and figures at 
the Spanish and Navaresse courts is both more numerous and topically diverse, therefore, the 
chances of finding letters that show Catherine‟s use of her eldest daughter are much more 
numerous. However, regardless of this fact, the mention of Elisabeth of Austria, in either an 
affectionate way or as a participant in court politics, occurs very infrequently within the 
correspondence between the French crown and either the Austrian or Spanish Habsburg houses.  
 Yet, if one takes Catherine‟s claim that her primary desire in brokering the marriage 
between Charles and Catherine was to preserve peace between the French king and the emperor, 
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then she was successful.  For the four years during which Charles and Elisabeth of Austria were 
married, France and the Holy Roman Empire were indeed at peace, though in the years prior to 
match, there was very little indication that war was imminent between the two states. Therefore, 
despite the more modest reasons that the Queen mother professed for pursuing this marriage, it is 
highly unlikely that her sole objective in seeking this union was the maintenance of peace with 
an outwardly non-belligerent power.  
 Though never implicitly stated by Catherine in her published correspondence, one can 
speculate, given the larger diplomatic issues of the period, what Catherine‟s ulterior motives may 
have been. As indicated in the earlier chapter, the Queen mother had hoped that the Emperor 
would be able to curtail the entrance of German mercenaries into France on the side of the 
Huguenots during the Second War of Religion in 1568.
130
 Also, during the negotiations for the 
marriage between Charles and Elisabeth, it was made evident to Maximilian that, in order for 
this marriage to take place, all imperial mercenaries serving the Huguenot cause needed to quit 
France. Despite the Emperor‟s apparent urging that the mercenaries leave France, it seems that 
the emperor was able to do relatively little to alleviate the internal pressures suffered by the 
French crown.
131
 Another potential reason that Catherine could have had for seeking the hand of 
Elisabeth of Austria was to seek to reorient Austrian diplomatic policy away from its Spanish 
cousins and towards its geographic neighbors, the French.  If that were the case, the marriage 
likewise failed to achieve this objective. The Austrian and Spanish Hapsburgs, regardless of 
moments of discord, would be allied for the next century. The marriage between King Charles 
and Elisabeth likewise failed to prevent and or assuage further political disagreements between 
the French crown and the emperor. For instance, the Emperor Maximilian refused to recognize 
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Catherine‟s cousin, Cosimo de‟ Medici, as Grand Duke of Florence.
132
 Catherine and 
Maximilian likewise locked horns over their sons‟ election to the Polish throne. Rather than 
supporting Henri, duke of Anjou‟s candidacy, the Emperor put forth his eldest son, the Archduke 
Rudolf, for the position, and was supported in these endeavors by the king of Spain.
133
 
 Of course, the marriage was not a complete loss. As already mentioned, a state of military 
peace existed between the France and the Holy Roman Empire for the short duration of Charles‟ 
and Elisabeth‟s marriage, which in retrospect, was a politically sound achievement, since a 
combined invasion of Spanish and Austrian forces, however unlikely, would have had 
deleterious results for France. Catherine was also known to have used Elisabeth‟s name in her 
diplomatic wrangling with the emperor. When the emperor refused to acknowledge Cosimo de‟ 
Medici as the grand duke of Florence, Catherine wrote to Jean de Vulcob, her ambassador to the 
Imperial court, stating that she spoke to her daughter-in-law, asking Elisabeth to write to her 
father the emperor on behalf of Catherine‟s cousin Cosimo.
134
 
However in the end, it seems that the match for which Catherine had worked tirelessly 
yielded few gains for either the French crown or the aggrandizement of her own political 
influence. Not only did Elisabeth not provide her husband with a male heir, she seems to have 
had very little political clout with either her father or her husband, and the existence of the match 
itself was not enough to preclude disagreements between the Emperor and the French 
government.  Of course, the last thing that Catherine needed in her court was a politically vocal 
or adept daughter-in-law, who could have acted as an advocate for Habsburg interests at the 
French court. Indeed, the fact that Catherine filled Elisabeth‟s household with Catherine‟s own 
“creatures” suggests that the Queen mother, at least initially, feared just that.   Though it is 
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tempting to believe that Catherine neglected or was unable to use Elisabeth to her benefit, 
because Elisabeth was already part of the extensive Habsburg political network, it seems that 
Catherine had no issue capitalizing on her relationship with other Habsburg women. In fact, 
Catherine wrote numerous letters to Elisabeth‟s sister, the queen of Spain, on a wide variety of 
political matters which Catherine evidently hoped the queen of Spain would pass on to her 
husband. So in the end, it seems the most likely cause of Catherine‟s failure to incorporate 
Elisabeth within her own political network was the personality and temperament of her daughter-
in-law, as well as the relatively brief duration of her marriage to King Charles.  
 
Louise de Lorraine-Vaudémont 
Similar to her sister-in-law Elisabeth of Austria, Louise de Lorraine-Vaudémont was 
reputed by her contemporaries and remembered by history as being a “beautiful,” “chaste and 
pious” wife and then widow.
135
 The daughter of Nicholas de Lorraine, duke of Mercœur and his 
first wife Marguerite d'Egmont, Louise de Lorraine-Vaudémont had the lowest pedigree of 
Catherine‟s daughters-in-law, even though Louise was both the niece of Charles III, duke of 
Lorraine and distantly related to powerful Guise clan. However, it seems that political necessity 
factored very little in the choice of Louise as the next queen consort of France. As the story goes, 
Henri III, then the duke of Anjou, was en route to Poland when he stopped at the court of Duke 
Charles. During his short sojourn in Nancy, the young and beautiful Louise caught his attention 
since she greatly resembled Henri‟s previous romantic attachment, Marie de Clèves, princess of 
Condé, who had recently died after giving birth to the prince of Condé‟s daughter that 
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 After returning to France following the death of Charles IX, King Henri III, 
remembering the young woman at Nancy, became resolved to espouse Louise, and the couple 
was married in February 1575.
137
 
What were Catherine‟s feelings about her son‟s intended mésalliance with a woman of 
comparatively low pedigree, who was also related to her perpetual political enemies, the house of 
Guise? Not surprisingly, Catherine initially did all in her power to thwart that match. Catherine 
had higher aspirations for her son than the mere niece of the duke of Lorraine, and before Henri 
III had resolved to marry Louise, Henri de Valois had been offered the hand of multiple ladies 
from much grander houses, including his former sister-in-law Elisabeth of Austria, Queen 
Elizabeth of England, Catherine de Bourbon, who was the king of Navarre‟s sister, and 
princesses from both Sweden and Denmark.
138
 As for Louise‟s affiliation with the house of 
Guise, Catherine was still ever fearful of their influence on their female members of their clan.
139
 
Regardless of Catherine‟s initial opinions of the match, by the time that Henri III began 
sending out official announcements of his engagement to all the European heads of state, 
Catherine appeared to be the marriage‟s greatest proponent, and in fact, took credit for it.
140
 In a 
letter written to the king of Spain, Henri III explains to Philip that, in marrying Louise, he is in 
fact following the implorations of his mother to marry.
141
 In addition to the letters written by 
Henri to various heads of state, Catherine would write her own missives announcing the 
impending marriage between Henri and “la fille de Monsieur de Vauldemont” to the duke Savoy 
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and the king and queen of Spain, among others, and in each letter, Catherine speaks approvingly 
of the match.  
Catherine‟s change of heart can possibly be explained in three ways. First, the Queen 
mother‟s behavior, at least in regards to her optimistic tone in these letters, is probably the result 
of Catherine‟s desire to seem like she still had influence over her son‟s political decisions, even 
though Henri III clearly chose Louise solely “pour [son] contentement.”
142
 Ascending to the 
throne at the age of twenty-three, Henri III was the only one of Catherine‟s sons who was not 
compelled to rule with a regency of some form. Therefore, Catherine may have been trying to 
give the impression that she still held significant power at court, despite that fact that she no 
longer had any official authority over her son. The second reason why the Queen mother may 
have come to accept the marriage is because she was desperate for Henri III to marry and to 
produce a male heir to ensure the prolongation of the House of Valois.  As she explained to King 
Philip, Louise was “belle” and “de age pour bientost avoyr lignée,” and perhaps Catherine 
predicted that Henri III‟s decidedly amorous intentions towards his future wife would be 
conducive to the production of an heir.
143
 The final motivation that could have induced Catherine 
into accepting Louise as her daughter-in-law was that Catherine was seeking to fill a hole 
recently left within her political network. Catherine‟s second eldest and favorite daughter Claude 
de Valois, wife of the Duke of Lorraine, died in childbirth on February 21, 1575, a few weeks 
before the intended marriage between Henri and Louise. Though Claude‟s death would not have 
been the cause of Catherine‟s more positive outlook on the marriage in the aforementioned 
letters written to the duke of Savoy and the king and queen of Spain, the passing of Claude may 
have caused Catherine to be further retrospective on the potential benefits of Henri‟s marriage to 
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Louise. Catherine no longer had a loyal ally placed within the House of Lorraine, and perhaps 
Catherine hoped that Louise could serve in a diplomatic capacity similar to Claude.  
Regardless of Catherine‟s motivations for finally approving this marriage, it seems that 
like her predecessor Elisabeth of Austria, Louise de Lorraine-Vaudémont would prove to be a 
disappointment to Catherine. Despite the fact that Henri III was evidently attentive to Louise, at 
least in the early years of their marriage before he shunned her bed for religiously motivated 
reasons, Louise remained barren throughout the duration of their marriage. In his journal 
covering the reign of Henri III, Pierre de l‟Estoile recounts how both the king and queen would 
make frequent pilgrimages in the hopes the imploring God and or the Virgin Mary to bestow on 
them a healthy son.
144
 L‟Estoile does not mention Catherine‟s response to Louise‟s barren state, 
however courtesy of Amias Paulet, another English ambassador to the French court, we know 
that Catherine was looking to supplant Louise with a younger and perceivably more fertile 
princess as early as 1578, even though “the Queen mother was once in danger of having the like 
practiced against her.” According to Paulet, Catherine was “treating with the Spaniard (Philip 




 If Catherine had hoped that Henri III‟s marriage to Louise would likewise mitigate the 
latent hostility between the French crown and Guise clan, she would be severely disappointed in 
this regard as well. Of course, historian Chantal Clément has recently asserted that Louise‟s 
position as queen of France helped build amicable relations with the house of Lorraine, however, 
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it seems that whatever rapprochement the crown and the Guise achieved during Louise‟s tenure 
as Queen quickly evaporated by the mid-1580s.
146
 
One of the most notable attempts by Henri III to align himself “to the Ultra-Catholic 
Guise faction” was through the marriage of Louise‟s younger half-sister, Marguerite de Lorraine-
Vaudémont, to one his “mignons,” Anne de Batarnay, duke of Joyeuse.
147
 Though popular rumor 
held that Joyeuse, like Henri‟s other male favorites, was in fact the king‟s lover, the elevation of 
previously low-ranking Joyeuse and other such mignons was more likely an attempt by Henri III 
to create a new, more loyal, sector of the nobility that owed its position only to the King. 
Therefore, in marrying Joyeuse to Marguerite de Lorraine-Vaudémont, Henri III was either 
attempting to legitimate Joyeuse‟s new social status through a marriage to a foreign princely 
house, or, Henri III was trying to connect his newer nobility (Joyeuse) to his older nobility (the 
house of Lorraine). Regardless, Joyeuse and Marguerite de Lorraine-Vaudémont were married in 
September 1581, and their wedding followed with days of sumptuous and ruinously expensive 
masquerades and tournaments.
148
 It is difficult to determine what role, if any, Catherine had in 
the fruition of this marriage; however, it seems that Catherine had at least endorsed it after the 
fact. Though it would never be performed, there is also some indication that Catherine attempted 
to plan a fête as part of the exorbitantly lavish ceremonies following the wedding.
149
 
Despite providing ample entertainment for Henri‟s courtiers, the marriage itself would do 
little in the way of improving the crown‟s relations with the house of Lorraine and Guise, as in 
the case with most other attempts made by Henri III and Catherine to put Louise‟s relatives in 
positions of power within both the French kingdom and the church. Despite being personally 
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recommended by Catherine for the bishopric of Toul in 1580, which he successfully acquired, 
Louise‟s younger half-brother Charles de Lorraine-Vaudémont, cardinal of Vaudémont, was one 
the founders of the Holy League that would seek to “exterminer les premiers de la maison de 
Bourbon, et les plus proches de la couronne, pour faire ouverte profession de ladite religion 
prétendue reformée.”
150
 Philippe-Emmanuel de Lorraine-Vaudémont, duke of Mercœur, was 
another younger half-brother of Louise who would, despite being bestowed with lucrative 
positions by his brother-in-law, set both his own interests and those of the house of Lorraine over 
those of the French crown. Given the governorship of Brittany by King Henri in 1582, Mercœur 
would withdraw from court with his Guise relative the duke of Mayenne in March 1587 and 
would retake control of province on behalf of the League.
151
 Ironically enough, Louise‟s sister, 
Marguerite de Lorraine-Vaudémont, who had been married to Henri III‟s favorite the duke of 
Joyeuse in 1582, would also join the League after the death of her husband. Due to her sibling‟s 
defection to the League, Henri III‟s consort was also suspected of having Leaguer sympathies 
during the lifetime of her husband. However, Louise would remain loyal to King Henri, even 
after the excommunication of the King following the murder of the duke of Guise, and would 
continue to petition the Pope to lift the bull of excommunication until her death in 1601.
152
 
In summary, regardless of their varying pedigrees, Catherine de‟ Medici initially saw a 
place for all of her daughters-in-law within her own extensive political system, though many of 
Catherine‟s ambitions for her daughters-in-law were left unrealized due to their simultaneous 
existence within one or more political networks, as well as other situational contributing factors. 
Catherine probably had little to no role in the brokering of the marriage between the young 
Scottish Queen and François II, but, it seems that after Mary returned to Scotland and had been 
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separated from her scheming Guise relatives, Catherine made great strides at mending their 
seriously strained relationship, and after Mary‟s imprisonment in England, Catherine tirelessly 
fought for the Scottish Queen‟s release. Regardless of these best efforts, it seems that Catherine‟s 
hopes for utilizing Mary‟s position were dashed by events that were out of her control. Though 
Catherine‟s goals for Elisabeth of Austria are much less discernable than Mary Stuart‟s, it seems 
that Elisabeth‟s marriage to Charles, a union that variously worked for,  likewise yielding few 
tangible gains for the French crown and for the maintenance of Catherine‟s own influence. Yet, 
unlike in the case of Mary, Queen of Scot, whose political ineptitude and position as a reigning 
Queen were the primary factors that prevented Catherine for effectively using Mary, it seems 
that in the case of Elisabeth of Austria, it was Elisabeth‟s reserved temperament, in addition to 
her comparatively short marriage that prevented her from developing a position of political 
influence at court. As for Louise de Lorraine-Vaudémont, it was most likely her barren state 
throughout her marriage, as well as the unpredictability of her Guise and Lorraine relations that 
prevented her from being of any substantial use to Catherine. However, regardless of these 
varying factors, it seems that all three daughters-in-law possessed one similarity that contributed 
to their political effectiveness, or lack thereof, for Catherine: their concurrent existence within 










Chapter 3: The Flying Squadron 
While Catherine de‟ Medici was attempting to capitalize on her daughters‟ positions of 
power within foreign courts and the perceived political connections of her daughters-in-law, the 
Queen mother was also incorporating an assortment of noblewomen of varying rank and 
economic standing within her political network. However, unlike Catherine‟s political 
relationship with her daughters and daughters-in-law which was more of a kinship-based system 
centered on notions of personal loyalty and familial responsibility, the Queen mother‟s 
association with the noblewomen of her court for political gain resembles more of a traditional 
patron-client network, in which “court noblewomen brokered royal patronage for personal profit 
and to advance their families and dependents.”
153
 
Throughout much of her tenure as Queen mother, Catherine had upwards of two hundred 
noblewomen in her service. Though the majority of them acted in more traditional capacities 
functioning as both social companions and domestic servants, Catherine also used those ladies 
who possessed certain special qualities in her quest to consolidate her own political influence. 
These particular qualities included physical beauty and personal charm, as well as a high degree 
of noble rank and economic influence inherited from their fathers or acquired through marriage. 
Private ambition on the part of the woman and her family played an integral role in the lady‟s 
acquiescence to Catherine‟s machinations, yet an obvious sense of public duty to the crown and 
the Queen mother was likewise desired by Catherine. Personal loyalty, or at least the appearance 
of personal loyalty, was an important component in the composition of Catherine‟s network of 
court ladies. However, the main ties that bound these women to the Queen mother and her 
political agenda was the prospect of economic wealth and increased political influence for 
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themselves and their relatives, and due to her status as both Queen mother and regent, Catherine 
de‟ Medici possessed almost unprecedented patronage powers for a woman at the French court.  
As such, this chapter‟s main focus will be on the Catherine‟s patron-client relationship 
with the noblewomen at the French court, how she sought to use these ladies for her benefit, and 
how she ensured their participation in her political machinations. Like the previous two chapters, 
this segment, rather than being a more generalized study, will be centered on Catherine‟s 
utilization of individual women. Focusing on two members of the infamous “escadron volant,” 
Louise de La Béraudière, also known as “la belle Rouhet” and Charlotte de Sauve respectively, 
this chapter will seek to explain how Catherine used their immense sexual appeal to placate and 
immobilize troublesome noblemen, when the continuance of Catherine‟s own political authority 
was in question.   
Despite Catherine de‟ Medici‟s significant reliance on noblewomen of all ranks to realign 
domestic politics to her benefit, it is perhaps Catherine‟s use of a certain sector of her ladies, 
known popularly to posterity as the “escadron volant,” or “flying squadron,” that gains the most 
attention within the scholarship of this period.  As popular legend contends, the “escadron 
volant” was essentially a bevy of beautiful, lower-ranking noblewomen used by Catherine to 
seduce potentially troublesome noble magnates. Though Catherine‟s use for each member of the 
squadron varied depending on which noble mark a particular lady had been assigned, the Queen 
mother usually had one of two objectives in placing squadron member before a male grandee. 
The first and most obvious was to reveal the political maneuverings of these noblemen which 
may have run contrary to Catherine‟s own designs and the second was to create dissention 




consciences “dulled,” these men likewise became more politically lethargic as a result of their 
dalliances with these women, making them more amenable to Catherine‟s agenda.
154
 
Regardless of the frequent, though not thorough, discussion of the “flying squadron,” 
much of the secondary works that touch upon this group of court women, especially during the 
nineteenth-century, profligates the “Black Legend” surrounding Catherine and her children. This 
was the result of either the religious and political biases of the historian, or the author‟s attempt 
to satisfy the public‟s cravings for tales of sexual immorality and political intrigue concerning 
long-dead French royalty. In addition to tailoring their findings to suit their own biases and the 
public‟s preferences, these works were also inadequately cited and poorly researched. Footnotes 
and other forms of citations are rarely found in scholarship that mentions members of the “flying 
squadron,” and when sources are included by the author, they are usually earlier secondary 
works published years after Catherine‟s death. Despite Margriet Hoogvliet‟s assertion that 
Catherine‟s ladies “have been associated too easily with sexuality by modern scholarship,” it 
seems that more recent serious studies of Catherine and her court avoid discussing the “flying 
squadron” at length, if they mention it at all.
155
  This is most likely due to the reticence of 
rigorous scholars to publish theories that cannot be supported by sufficient evidence.   
Regardless of the lack of primary sources mentioning Catherine‟s utilization of these 
court women, larger conclusions about the function of the flying squadron can still be reached 
through a more thorough reading of existing sources. Though it is still difficult to determine what 
directives, if any, came from Catherine, we can still make conjectures on the flying squadron‟s 
function within the Queen mother‟s network, as well as its impact on court politics, by following 
patterns of behavior among the targeted grandees. In other words, we can measure the political 
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impact of the flying squadron by examining the political activities of these noblemen, and their 
stance towards Catherine‟s governmental policy, before and after they had been introduced to a 
particular member of the “flying squadron.” 
Louise de La Béraudière: “ la belle Rouhet”   
 Though she may have not been the founding member of the flying squadron, Louise de 
La Béraudière, known affectionately within the court as “la belle Rouhet,” was certainly one of 
the first, and likewise most famous, filles d’honneur that the politically vulnerable Queen mother 
used to manage her high-ranking noblemen.
156
 Like many members of the “flying squadron,” 
many of the particulars of Rouhet‟s early life are relatively unknown. Rouhet was the daughter of 
a Poitevin nobleman Louis de La Béraudière, seigneur de Sourches and Rouhet and marquis de 
l‟Isle-Jourdain. Born sometime in 1538, as most genealogical works assert, the unmarried 
Rouhet was most likely in her late teens to early twenties when she began her court career, where 
she gained great notoriety for her beauty. According to Brantôme, such was Louise‟s physical 
appeal, that if the legendary Roland were still alive, his love for her would defy “les cieux.”
157
 It 
is difficult to pinpoint when exactly Catherine offered up her pretty provincial fille d’honneur to 
Catherine‟s most pliable and unpredictable noble ally, Antoine de Bourbon, King of Navarre. 
However, it seems likely that the sexual relationship between Antoine and Rouhet began a few 
months prior to Antoine‟s death in November 1562, resulting in the birth of Antoine‟s 
illegitimate son in 1563.
158
 
 However, just because there is a relative dearth of primary evidence discussing 
Mademoiselle de Rouhet‟s dalliance with the king of Navarre, that does not mean that her place 
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in Catherine‟s political network and her role in court politics must remain shrouded in mystery. 
Rather, this lack of sources directly discussing Rouhet only necessitates a different way of 
approaching existing evidence. As previously indicated in the introduction of this chapter, one 
can gauge the political influence of a member of the “flying squadron” by examining patterns of 
behavior and the evolution of personal political policy before and after the commencement of a 
lady‟s affair with a noble magnate. Therefore, this section will not so much be a discussion of 
Rouhet‟s life and court career, but rather, a comparative analysis of Catherine‟s and the king of 
Navarre‟s political relationship before and after Navarre‟s introduction to Rouhet. What crises in 
foreign diplomacy, domestic policy and court factionalism involving the king of Navarre caused 
Catherine to solicit Rouhet to seduce Antoine de Bourbon, and did these political issues begin to 
improve in Catherine‟s favor after the king of Navarre began his affair with “la belle Rouhet?” 
Why would Catherine solicit Rouhet to ensnare the King of Navarre, and what positive 
effect, if any, did Rouhet‟s affair with Antoine have on the Queen mother‟s ability to control this 
Bourbon prince? In addition to being the first prince of the blood, and therefore heir to the 
French throne if the male Valois line should become extinct, Antoine was the husband of the 
newly converted queen regnant of Navarre, Jeanne d‟Albret, a woman who would become one of 
Catherine‟s greatest political and religious rivals. Though the king of Navarre never officially 
converted, the religious proclivities of Antoine‟s wife and younger brother, as well as his 
embrace of certain Calvinist practices, caused many European Protestants to view him as the 
titular head of the Huguenot movement in France, despite his continued mass attendance and his 
own professions of religious orthodoxy.
159
 Yet, despite Antoine‟s initial high standing within 
Calvinist circles, which could have provided him a base of political and military support both 
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within France and abroad if he had chosen to capitalize on his position, and despite his 
prominence within the line of succession, it seems that the king of Navarre never achieved a 
degree of authority consistent with his rank or that likewise satisfied his own ambitions. 
Therefore, in his quest for greater political influence, Antoine frequently changed political 
affiliations, entering into schemes with other noble magnates that often undermined Catherine‟s 
own political program.  
Regardless of Antoine‟s later political betrayals, it seemed, at least during the uncertain 
days of François II‟s reign, that Catherine could depend on the Bourbon prince to help counteract 
Guise political hegemony. When the Guise brothers assumed control of the government 
following the death of Henri II, the Queen mother was not the only individual who had had their 
authority snatched from them. After the king of Navarre returned to the French court, the feud 
between the first Prince of the Blood and the Guise brothers continued to fester, and in June 
1560, an attempt was made on Antoine‟s life by “instruments of the Guises.”
160
 This 
assassination attempt was then followed by the imprisonment of Antoine‟s brother the prince of 
Condé by the Guise-led royal council on charges of heresy and rebellion in November of the 
same year due to his perceived involvement in the conspiracy of Amboise. Though the king of 
Navarre was allowed to go “at his liberty,” he was, for all intents and purposes, also held 
“tanquam captivus” at court.
161
 Despite the general opinion that the “House of Guise would do 
all in its power to unite with the king of Navarre” in the event of François II‟s death, the Queen 
mother found a willing ally in the form of the king of Navarre when Charles IX ascended to the 
throne.
162
 As such, in March 1561, Catherine appointed Antoine to the post of lieutenant-general, 
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a position previously held by the duke of Guise, effectively giving the king of Navarre control 
over all of France‟s military forces. In spite of having conferred this enormous responsibility on 
the Bourbon prince, Catherine remained adamant that primary authority within the government 
still rested with her.
163
 However, unfortunately for Catherine, the king of Navarre began to 
gravitate towards the fallen Guise faction as early as spring 1561, with both the Bourbon princes 
and the Guise brothers becoming “great friends.”
164
  
So, how did Navarre‟s break with the Queen mother, as well as his subsequent alliance 
with the Guise come about? Despite their initial political amity during the first months of Charles 
IX‟s reign, there was probably always a sense of mutual mistrust and resentment between the 
Queen mother and the king of Navarre, particularly on Antoine‟s part, that had its origins during 
the reign of Henri II. In 1559, Françoise de Rohan, a female relative of the king of Navarre, 
began proceedings against Jacques de Savoie, duke of Nemours, a Guise ally at court, claiming 
not only that Nemours was the father of her illegitimate child, but also that the duke had secretly 
married her. 
165
 When Nemours denied having ever married Françoise and likewise declared that 
he had no intention of marrying her, the king and queen of Navarre took the side of their female 
relative. 
166
 Though Catherine attempted to appease both sides in this incident, she would 
eventually intervene on the side of Jacques, most likely acquiring the ire of the king of Navarre, 
who saw this whole affair as a matter of family honor.
167
  
 The rift between the Queen mother and her lieutenant-general, despite Antoine‟s 
continued prominent and comparatively influential station within Catherine‟s government, would 
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also come about largely as a consequence of the Guises‟ keen ability to manipulate the politically 
inept and overly ambitious Antoine. As previously mentioned, during his time at Catherine‟s 
court, Antoine de Bourbon was consumed by his desire to regain Spanish-occupied Navarre from 
King Philip, a fact that was not lost on the ever perceptive Guise brothers who tried to convince 
the king of Navarre that the best way to recoup the southern portion of his kingdom was to 
dislodge Catherine and assume her powers of governance.
168
 
Another sore point between Catherine and the king of Navarre, to which the Guise clan 
contributed, was Antoine‟s frequent alignment with the political and religious program of the 
“triumvirate” and its allies at court. Comprised of the duke of Guise, the constable 
Montmorency, and Jacques d‟Albon, the marshal Saint André, the triumvirate was essentially a 
noble coalition bent on suppressing the Protestant religion in France.
169
 Despite Antoine‟s initial 
Calvinist leanings, it seems that after falling under the influence of both the Guise brothers and 
the Cardinal of Ferrara, “le Roy de Navarre… s‟est declaré pour la Party Catholique en faveur 
duquel il a conclu tout ouvertement.”
170
 Regardless of Catherine‟s later reputation for Catholic 
fanaticism, the Queen mother, at least during the early years of Charles IX‟s reign, took a more 
moderate stance concerning the issue of religious heresy, tolerating it among her courtiers and 
even attending Calvinist services occasionally. As a result, the Queen mother was often accused 
by her more staunchly Catholic nobles and prelates of being too soft on heresy. In addition to the 
three members of the triumvirate, this backlash against Calvinism, and subsequently Catherine‟s 
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regency for tolerating it, was also encouraged by the Spanish ambassador, as well as by a 
“confederacy” of noble magnates devoted to Ippolito d‟Este, cardinal of Ferrara.
171
  
Fearing further loss of her own authority, Catherine initially solicited the king of Navarre 
to intercede on her behalf with Catholic noblemen, in an attempt to quell their disquietudes about 
her lenience towards Calvinism. However, it soon became evident that the king of Navarre was, 
at least for the moment, too easily swayed by the rabidly Catholic camp and too obsessed with 
regaining Spanish Navarre to help prop up her tottering regency.  “The King of Navarre is all 
Spanish now,” declared Sir Nicholas Throckmorton to William Cecil, and “men suspect that he 
will become a persecutor,” since he now “only shows favor to the Papists.”
172
 Though the 
Protestant Throckmorton‟s description of the king of Navarre‟s political and religious extremism 
may be slightly exaggerated, this assessment is nonetheless indicative of developing alliance 
between the King of Navarre and those ultra-Catholics that sought displace the Queen mother. 
 In reaction to this coalition forming against her, of which her lieutenant-general was a 
leading figure, Catherine, out of either political prudence or desperation, took “les voix des 
autres.”
173
 The Queen mother now turned to Antoine‟s Protestant relatives, the Queen of Navarre 
and the prince of Condé, as well as other high-ranking Huguenot noblemen like the Admiral 
Coligny and his male relatives to help combat the triumvirate and its allies.
174
 Of course, another 
individual upon whom the Queen mother evidently called to rectify her political quagmire, was 
one of her young provincial ladies-in-waiting, Louise de La Béraudière, better known as the 
“belle Rouhet.”   
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As previously mentioned, it is difficult to determine when Catherine placed her beautiful 
fille d’honneur before the king of Navarre, since very few primary sources mention Rouhet or 
her relationship with Antoine directly. In a letter dated May 1561, Antoine‟s would be religious 
mentor John Calvin scolds the king of Navarre for his numerous “folles amours” while residing 
at the French court.
175
 However, Antoine had always been a philanderer, so Rouhet may have not 
been involved in any of these dalliances that Calvin was mentioning in this written chastisement. 
Instead, it is more likely that the affair between the king of Navarre and Rouhet began only 
months before Antoine‟s death in November 1562, as nineteenth-century French historian 
Alphonse de Ruble has speculated. A scholar who depended heavily on primary sources, Ruble 
refers to a letter written by the Spanish ambassador, Perrenot de Chantonnay, dated May 23, 
1562, as being the earliest allusion to the affair between Antoine de Bourbon and Mademoiselle 
Rouhet.
176
 Though it impossible to claim with certainty when their relationship began, Ruble‟s 
spring 1562 approximation seems like a reasonable conjecture due to what we know about the 
deteriorating relations between the Queen Mother and the king of Navarre during the early 
winter and spring of 1562. In other words, it seems that Catherine enlisted her pretty lady-in-
waiting to seduce her lieutenant-general just as cordial interactions between the Queen mother 
and the King of Navarre were reaching their nadir.   
Within the aforementioned Chantonnay letter, the Spanish ambassador dismayingly 
related how Rouhet was being used by the Queen mother to both to divulge secrets from 
Antoine, and to likewise detach the King of Navarre from his ultra-Catholic allies.
177
 In regards 
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to her first assignment, it is almost impossible to assess Rouhet‟s ability to, in the words of 
Chantonnay, “„scavoir [les] secrets‟” of the king of Navarre. As already implied, there is no 
surviving evidence that relates or suggests what information the “belle Rouhet” may have passed 
on to Catherine. There is also no evidence of any Catholic plots being foiled by the Queen 
mother that could have been conceivably brought to her attention by Rouhet. Yet, as for 
Rouhet‟s second mission, which was to drive a wedge between the king of Navarre and the 
confederacy of court Catholics, there is some indication that Catherine‟s young fille d’honneur 
may have had some success. Beginning in late spring and early summer of 1562, it seems that 
the king of Navarre, though still allied with the ultra-Catholics at court, began to function less as 
a creature of the Spanish-Guise faction and began to represent the interests of Catherine‟s 
government more openly.  
After the massacre at Vassy in March 1562, when the duke of Guise and his soldiers 
killed upwards of one-hundred Huguenot parishioners, the prince of Condé, Antoine‟s brother 
and now the head of the Huguenot movement in France, mobilized a Protestant army and took 
the city of Orleans on the pretext that King Charles and the Queen mother were being held 
captive there in the castle of Fontainebleau.
178
 Probably due to pressure from the Guise and their 
allies, the king of Navarre initially thwarted Catherine‟s attempts at negotiating with Condé, 
most likely because these ultra-Catholics at court initially feared that the Queen mother would 
tryto aid Condé and his party.
179
 However, by late April, Antoine would acquiesce to Catherine‟s 
request that both he and the Queen mother go to meet Condé, only to have this project denied by 
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Guise, Montmorency and St. Andre.
180
 Later attempts by the Queen mother and the King of 
Navarre at negotiating with Condé and his Protestant allies in the summer of 1562 were more 
successful.  Though they did little in way of compelling Condé to disarm, Catherine and Antoine 
worked furiously in conjunction with one another to achieve an accord with Condé, and the 
Queen mother‟s letters from that period indicate that she was now primarily depending on the 
king of Navarre to assuage this crisis with his brother.
181
 Writing to Rennes at the Imperial court 
in July 1562, Catherine explained to her ambassador that she was depending on Navarre to 
“renoué ce négoce avec mon cousin le prince de Condé…qu‟il me prioyt ne plaindre poinct ma 
peine d‟aller encores faire ung voyaige jusques au delà d‟Orléans.
182
 The Queen mother 
expressed these same sentiments in a missive to the Charles de Cossé, the marshal Brissac, 
telling Brissac that it was the king of Navarre was working to pacify these troubles.
183
  
Despite the King of Navarre‟s frequent implorations to his brother, the prince of Condé 
remained “obstinate” and continued to wage war on the royalist Catholic forces until his capture 
at Dreux in December 1562, by none other than the forces of the duke of Guise.
184
 As for 
Condé‟s brother, the king of Navarre was shot in the shoulder by an arabesque in October 1562 
while attempting to combat French Huguenot forces in Normandy.
185
 Though it initially seemed 
that the king of Navarre would survive his injuries (Antoine even invited Mademoiselle de 
Rouhet to his bedside to accompany him in his convalescence), his wounds would become 
infected and the king of Navarre would die a month later.
186
 However, before succumbing to his 
injuries, Antoine de Bourbon reconverted and died in the “Confession of Augsburg,” evidently 
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declaring in his delirium that if he survived, he would make peace with his brother and would do 
all in his power to further the Protestant cause within France.
187
 According to the Venetian 
ambassador, Marc Antonio Barbaro, Catherine seemed saddened by the king of Navarre‟s 
passing, and spoke of his death to the ambassador with “much grief.”
188
 However, a few days 
later, Barbaro wrote to the Venetian Senate, claiming that the “effect of the death of the King of 
Navarre remained to be seen,” and that the Queen mother was meanwhile busy arranging a 




Charlotte de Beaune Semblançay, Baroness of Sauve 
Despite the eventual notoriety of Rouhet‟s affair with the two Bourbon princes, it is 
Charlotte de Beaune Semblançay, Baroness of Sauve, who is undeniably the most recognizable 
member of the “flying squadron,” due to Marguerite de Valois‟s extensive and generally 
unflattering depiction of Madame de Sauve in her memoirs, as well as to Sauve‟s reputation for 
being “l‟une des plus belles de la cour d‟Henri III, & de celles de deux rois ses prédécesseurs.”
190
 
Madame de Sauve was of a slightly higher pedigree than Rouhet and Limeuil. She was the 
daughter and heiress of the Touraine nobleman Jacques de Beaune, baron Semblançay and 
Viscount of Tours, and upon his death, the young Charlotte assumed her father‟s titles. Spending 
much of her early life at court, in 1569, Charlotte would marry Simon Fizes, baron de Sauve, a 
prominent secretary of State during the reigns of Charles IX and Henri III. Though Emmanuel le 
Roy Ladurie had asserted that Fizes was a Guise protégé, scholar N.M Sutherland has also 
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claimed that Fizes political ascent, starting from the position of garde de sceaux in 1553 and 
culminating in his appointment as secretary of State in in 1567, can be attributed to the 
sponsorship of the Queen mother.
191
 It is therefore due to a sense of indebtedness, or more likely 
the desire to acquire additional patronage, that Fizes tolerated or even encouraged the entrance of 
his wife into numerous affairs on behalf of Catherine de‟ Medici.  
Though Madame de Sauve was reputed to have had numerous dalliances while acting as 
one of Catherine‟s dame d’honneurs, these affairs were not always at the behest of the Queen 
mother. This section will focus on two of the most notable lovers whom the baroness was 
solicited to seduce as a member of Catherine‟s “flying squadron,” Henri de Bourbon, King of 
Navarre and François de Valois, Duke of Alençon. With Marguerite de Valois‟s rather colorful 
depiction of the tumultuous love triangle between the king of Navarre, the duke of Alençon, and 
Madame de Sauve in her memoirs, we are given a detailed analysis of the methods used by 
Sauve to manipulate these men, as well as the political reasoning behind these liaisons.  
 Regardless of eventual conjectures that could be made about the affair between Madame 
de Sauve and the Duke of Guise, we can conclude with almost absolute certainty that Catherine 
de‟ Medici used the beautiful baroness to seduce both her youngest son, the duke of Alençon and 
her son-in-law, the king of Navarre, in an attempt both to quash their budding alliance and to 
immobilize them politically in the months following the St. Bartholomew‟s Day Massacre.
192
 
Though the duke of Alençon remained a staunch Catholic until his premature death in 1584, 
beginning in around 1571, Catherine‟s youngest son began to assume a much more moderate 
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stance on the issue of religious heresy.
193
 When Coligny returned to the Valois court after the 
conclusion of the Third Religious War, the Calvinist admiral became a kind of mentor figure to 
the youngest and decidedly most neglected of Catherine‟s sons, much to the chagrin of both the 
Queen mother and Alençon‟s two elder brothers.
194
  
Why Alençon formed this friendship with Coligny and subsequently came to head the 
religious moderate, or politique, movement within France, can never be fully understood. Yet, 
one can still speculate as to his motivations. Childhood illness had left the young Alençon pox-
faced and ill-formed, and the personal insecurities that accompany such physical deformities, 
coupled with both the inattention the duke received from his mother and the hatred he bore for 
his brothers, undoubtedly played a role in his decision to befriend the Admiral and then the king 
of Navarre. However, it was most likely his intense personal ambition that was left unfulfilled 
due to both his age and intellectual inadequacies that led Alençon to politically and militarily 
align with the Huguenot cause around the time of the massacre. In short, by collaborating with 
his family‟s religious rivals, the duke hoped to gain the political influence and he had long 
craved but had thus far been denied by his mother and brothers.   
As for Alençon‟s would be political ally, Henri de Bourbon, King of Navarre, his 
decision to form an alliance with Catherine‟s youngest son came about less the result of political 
ambition and more due to his desire to be free of the Valois captors. Immediately following the 
St. Bartholomew‟s Day Massacre in August 1572, the Huguenot king of Navarre, along with his 
cousin Henri I de Bourbon, prince of Condé were kept confined at the Valois court, and 
compelled to convert to “l‟église Catholique, Apostolique [et] Romaine.”
195
  However, the 
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conversion of the king of Navarre did little to assuage Catherine‟s and her Catholic courtiers‟ 
fears that the king of Navarre‟s and his conspirators, which now included the duke of Alençon, 
were secretly scheming for Navarre‟s release, so that the king may rejoin his religious allies and 
take military action against the crown. 
Needless to say, these fears concerning both Navarre and Alençon were not unfounded. 
According to Marguerite de Valois, her younger brother, the Duke of Alençon, had been aligned 
with the Huguenot party even before the St. Bartholomew‟s Day Massacre, when those French 
Huguenots, most likely Coligny, who favored war against Spain, had made promises to Alençon, 
assuring him the crown of the Netherlands should France support Dutch independence.
196
 
Therefore, it is not surprising that after assassination of the Admiral, both Alençon and the king 
of Navarre made written promises to the Huguenots that they would avenge the death of Coligny. 
When the aging Montmorency withdrew from court in 1574, duke of Alençon became the main 
focal point for those disgruntled Protestants and politique Catholics.  However, despite his 
increasing influence within politique circles at court, the young duke still failed to receive high-
ranking appointments within Charles IX‟s government. Though he had been promised the post of 
lieutenant-general by his brother, the position ultimately went to his archrival, the ultra-Catholic 
Henri de Lorraine, duke of Guise, and perhaps it was this stinging betrayal that caused Alençon 
to conspire against his brother in February 1574. In addition to making plans with the King of 
Navarre to escape the French court, it seems that Alençon and his Protestant allies were 
attempting to coordinate a series of Huguenot uprisings that would result in a coup at court. 
197
 
When questioned about the plot by King Charles and the Queen mother, Alençon claimed that 
his actions were not aimed at his brother, but rather at dislodging the duke of Guise, and later in 
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a written declaration, the King of Navarre would disavow any knowledge of the plot. 
198
 As for 
Catherine‟s reaction to her son‟s perfidies, it seems that due to political necessity she was 
inclined to support the amicable rapprochement between King Charles and Alençon after the plot 
had been exposed, but was insistent that Alençon‟s lower-ranking conspirators “be punished.”
199
  
Prior to the exposure of this intended coup d‟état, Catherine had been well aware of the 
“mescontentment du duc d‟Alençon de la journee de St. Barthelemy,” and despite Alençon‟s 
later rebellious endeavors, Catherine did initially make attempts to mitigate her son‟s 
dissatisfaction with his relegated position within his brother‟s government. For instance, the 
Queen mother put her youngest son in charge of Catholic army bent on retaking the Protestant 
stronghold of La Rochelle in 1573.
200
 However, it seems that by the commencement of Henri 
III‟s reign, Catherine had decided to employ a new tactic to assuage her son‟s discontentment, 
and to likewise obstruct the troublesome alliance between Alençon and king of Navarre.  
As previously stated, there are no sources that unassailably prove that Catherine gave 
direct orders to Charlotte de Sauve, or to any other member of the “escadron volant,” to seduce 
these two princes for Catherine‟s benefit.  In fact, within her memoirs, Marguerite de Valois 
asserts that it was the mignon Louis Berenger du Guast, in conjunction with Henri III, who 
solicited the beautiful baroness to seduce Alençon and Navarre.
201
 However, considering the 
political ramifications of these simultaneous affairs, as well as the strong patron-client ties 
existing between the Queen mother and both Charlotte‟s Fizes and Beaune relations, it seems 
much more likely that Catherine was the one who initiated, or at the very least guaranteed, its 
occurrence.  
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In addition to being the wife of one of Catherine‟s secretaries of State, whose career 
Catherine had personally nurtured, Madame de Sauve was also the niece of Claude de Beaune, 
duchess of Rouannez, a great favorite of the Queen mother since the reign of Henri II, and who 
had for some time acted as the treasurer of Catherine‟s household.
202
 It was Claude‟s close 
rapport with the Queen mother that caused Claude‟s second husband, the marquis of Boisi, to be 
elevated to the duchy of Rouannez upon his marriage with Claude. Also due to Claude‟s 
friendship with Catherine, the royal favorite was able to secure the archbishopric of Bourges for 
her brother Renaud de Beaune.
203
 Though Claude probably had no role in the fruition of the 
affair itself, it is likely that Claude‟s friendship Queen mother recommended the services of the 
young Charlotte to Catherine, facilitating Charlotte‟s entrance into the Queen‟s household and 
likewise into Catherine‟s female-oriented political system.  
Another indication of Catherine‟s complicity in these affairs is the simple fact that 
Madame de Sauve was one Catherine‟s dame d’honneurs, meaning that the young baroness‟s 
daily activities usually revolved around Catherine‟s own schedule. As for Marguerite‟s fingering 
of Du Guast as the primary culprit behind Madame de Sauve‟s dalliances, it is likely that 
Marguerite misrepresented this admission in her memoirs due to political caution. Both Henri III 
and Catherine were alive while Marguerite was penning her memoirs in the chateau d‟Usson 
where she was confined. Therefore, Marguerite may have been reluctant to attribute primary 
responsibility to her brother and mother in this sordid affair while they still had the power to 
release her.  
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In addition to the aforementioned factual distortion in Marguerite‟s writings, another 
weakness Margeruite‟s account is that she fails to provide dates for when these events that she 
depicted actually occurred. However, regardless of this deficiency, we are still able to roughly 
estimate when Charlotte de Sauve was enlisted by Catherine, Henri III and Du Guast to seduce 
the king of Navarre and the duke of Alençon. The evidence seems to indicate that this affair 
commenced in either January or February of 1575. In a letter to Sir Francis Walsingham dated 
February 13, 1575, Dr. Dale recounted that there was a continued state of jealousy existing 
between the King of Navarre and Alençon that was “not yet quenched.”
204
 This missive is then 
followed by another letter from Dr. Dale in March of the same year, in which he explained to 
Cecil that dissention was being sown “between Monsieur and the King of Navarre by a women,” 
in an obvious reference to Madame de Sauve. However, rather than attributing quarrel to the 
machinations of Catherine, Henri III or Du Guast, Dale mistakenly claims that it was the duke of 
Guise who incited this jealousy between Alençon and Navarre.
205
  
Despite her account‟s evident faults, Marguerite‟s memoirs are, nonetheless, the most 
extensive depiction of the love-triangle between the Madame de Sauve, the duke of Alençon and 
the King of Navarre, and give the most complete case study in how the Queen mother used a 
member “flying squadron” to manipulate domestic politics and destabilize rival court factions.  
According to Marguerite, Henri III and Du Guast, and we can assume Catherine, recognized the 
threat that an alliance between Alençon and Navarre posed to the stability of the realm, and 
therefore sought to initiate a quarrel between the two young men over the beautiful Madame de 
Sauve, whom both Alençon and Navarre “visited.” Regardless of the relative simplicity of the 
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plot, Marguerite claims that baroness‟s concurrent liaisons caused much “disquietude and 
unhappiness” between Alençon and Navarre, and well as between the two princes and 
Marguerite, who was considered to be the bond that united the two men.
206
   
Of course, it was well known that Madame de Sauve had numerous other lovers, 
including the duke of Guise, Du Guast and Gilles de Souvré, the marquis de Courtenvaux. Still, 
as Marguerite recounted, “the passion which these two young men had conceived” for 
Catherine‟s dame d’honneur would eventually become “so violent that ambition and every 
obligation of duty were at once absorbed by their attentions to this woman.”
207
 Though they 
make no mention of interference of Madame de Sauve, or any lady for that matter, the missives 
sent to Sir Francis Walsingham by English envoys Sir John Willes and Dr. Valentine Dale 
support Marguerite‟s depiction of the severity of this schism and the success of Madame de 
Sauve‟s maneuvering on behalf of the Queen mother, Henri III, and his mignon. “The quarrel 
between the King of Navarre and the Duke is greater than ever it was,” announced Willes, “so 
that one of these days they will cut the throats one of the other.”
208
 Dr. Valentine Dale also 
echoed Willes‟ observations in another letter to Walsingham, stating that the king of Navarre 
was still “set agog to make himself party against Monsieur.”
209
  
 However, in addition to causing a rupture between the duke of Alençon and the king of 
Navarre, Catherine and Henri III also sought to create discord between Marguerite and the two 
besotted princes, since Marguerite was attempting to act as a mediator between her husband and 
brother.
210
 According to Marguerite that “Circe,” as the Queen of Navarre so indignantly referred 
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to Madame de Sauve, went to Marguerite‟s husband, claiming that Marguerite was in fact jealous 
of her, and that Marguerite had recently taken sides with her brother, now Navarre‟s political as 
well as romantic rival, the duke of Alençon. Madame de Sauve further claimed that Marguerite 
could so often be found in Alençon‟s apartments because Marguerite was having an affair with a 
member of her brother‟s entourage, Bussy d‟Amboise.
211
 Although in her memoirs Marguerite 
asserted that the King of Navarre “could not be induced to lend an ear to the story,” in July 1575 
the English ambassador nonetheless recounted that Bussy d‟Amboise was forced to flee court for 
fear of the king of Navarre‟s vengeance.
212
 Having lost both her husband‟s confidence and favor, 
Marguerite turned her attention to separating her brother from Madame de Sauve, but, like 




Of course, there were factors that could have contributed to this schism between the duke 
of Alençon and the king of Navarre. In addition to any resentment Alençon may have felt at the 
predictions made that he would never rule, and that Navarre would “have his portion,” it seems 
that both men coveted the office of lieutenant general, and there may have been some rivalries 
between members of their respective entourages that would have exacerbated their own feud.
214
 
However, though these issues may have had some role in creating this rift between Catherine‟s 
youngest son and son-in-law, they do not plausibly account for why the relationship between 
Alençon and Navarre and Marguerite and the two men seemed to deteriorate simultaneously and 
so severely.  Therefore, it can only be assumed that it was Madame de Sauve‟s interference that 
played that was the primary cause of this quarrel.  
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In the end, despite her best efforts, it seems that the estimable charms of Madame de 
Sauve could not squash the independent ambitions of the duke of Alençon and the king of 
Navarre.  With the aid of Marguerite, the duke of Alençon was the first to escape from court in 
September 1575, and was followed in his flight by the king of Navarre in early 1576.
215
  Having 
finally been separated from Madame de Sauve, and now surrounded by his friends and 
dependents in Gascony, the king of Navarre apparently emerged from his political lethargy, and 
finally conceived of the “plot and machinations of [his] enemies.” Though the duke of Alençon 
was at that time residing in Champagne, Marguerite asserts that a state of friendship nonetheless 
now existed between the two former romantic rivals.
216
 
Despite the flight of Madame de Sauve‟s two royal lovers, the pretty baroness still 
appears to have remained a visible and prominent fixture at court and a key component within 
Catherine‟s network of court noblemen, as shown in the May 15, 1577 entry of Pierre de 
l‟Estoile‟s journal. After the sacking of La Charité, Henri III hosted a lavish banquet with his 
brother, now of the duke of Anjou, and with many other high-ranking lords and ladies in 
attendance. According to l‟Estoile, “en ce beau banquet, les dames les plus belles et honnêtes de 
la cour, étant à moitié nues et ayant leurs cheveux épars comme épousées, furent employées à 
faire le service.” Evidently, during these festivities, Madame de Sauve acted as one of the 
maitresses d’hôtel.
217
 As to whether or not Henri III and Catherine were attempting to once again 
reignite the newly returned Anjou‟s passions for the baroness by giving her this prominent 
position within the festivities, we can only guess. However, it is interesting to note that when 
Catherine‟s “prodigal son” finally returned to Paris in February 1584, this time after Anjou‟s 
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disastrous military campaign in the Netherlands, Anjou‟s newfound amity with his brother the 




 As previously mentioned, the main factor that caused these noblewomen to acquiesce to 
the requests of the Queen mother was the prospect of patronage and economic advancement. So, 
what did Louise de La Béraudière, or “la belle Rouhet” and Charlotte de Sauve hope to gain, or 
eventually acquire, from seducing these princely magnates on behalf of the Queen mother? 
Though Catherine undoubtedly initiated, or at least encouraged these liaisons, existing evidence 
seems to indicate that as the affairs were occurring, it was the royal lovers themselves, not 
Catherine, who distributed forms of patronage to Rouhet‟s and Sauve‟s male relatives. For 
instance, Rouhet‟s uncle François du Fou, seigneur du Vigean, had a high-ranking position 
within the Antoine de Bourbon‟s household during the king of Navarre‟s liaison with his 
niece.
219
 As for Charlotte de Sauve, her uncle Renaud de Beanue was the duke of Anjou‟s 
chancellor until 1580, and as a result of Renaud‟s chancellorship, another of Charlotte‟s uncles, 
Martin de Beaune, was given the position of premier conseiller de Monseigneur in 1576.
220
 
 If Catherine made any guarantees to Mademoiselle de Rouhet or Madame de Sauve 
before lobbying them to ensnare these three male royals, it was either the false promise of 
marriage, most likely in the case of Rouhet, or the assurance that these women would be 
financially taken care of after their respective affairs had ended. Though there is no evidence that 
implicitly states that Rouhet was promised marriage to the king of Navarre by either Antoine 
himself or the Queen mother, it seems that after the death of the king of Navarre, Rouhet thought 
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of herself as if she were the dead king‟s widow. As Antoine‟s brother, the prince of Condé, 
sardonically recounted in his memoirs, Mademoiselle de Rouhet wore the “vestements de dueil 




However, a much more likely promise made by Catherine to Rouhet, and likewise to 
Madame de Sauve, was that the crown would secure a comparatively advantageous marriage for 
her should the affair end or Antoine decide not to take care of her financially. If that were the 
case, Catherine did indeed fulfill that obligation. After the death of Navarre, Rouhet would 
quickly be married to Louis de Madaillan, seigneur de Lesparre and baron d‟Estissac, who, 
among other appointments, was also the governor of La Rochelle.
222
 In January 1580, fifteen 
years following the death of her first husband, Rouhet would then marry Henri III‟s future 
premier maître d’hôtel, Robert de Combaut, seigneur de Arcis-sur-Aube, and around the time of 
his marriage to Rouhet, Combaut would acquire the title „comte de Chateauvillain‟.
223
  
As for Madame de Sauve, it is unlikely that she had any allusions about marriage 
between herself and either the duke of Alençon or the king of Navarre. Knowing the blind 
passion that the young baroness incited in her youngest son and son-in-law, the Queen mother 
certainly would not have planted that idea her lady‟s head. Therefore, due also to the fact that 
Sauve‟s was already married to a trusted secretary of the Queen, Madame de Sauve most likely 
hoped simply that this affair would improve her position at court and ensure her good standing 
with the Queen mother. Madame de Sauve‟s husband, Simon de Fizes, died in 1579, and though 
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she would continue to have numerous lovers, the still beautiful Charlotte married once again in 
1584.  This time, her husband was François de la Trémoille, marquis of Noirmoutier and a first 
cousin to the princess of Condé.  Though it is difficult to discern whether the Queen mother had 
had a hand in this advantageous marriage, we do know that for the duration of Catherine‟s life, 
Charlotte‟s prominent position in the Queen‟s household continued, and after the succession of 






















The historiography concerning early modern female networks has developed over the 
past few decades, but has left some topics unexplored.  One example is the political career of 
Catherine de‟ Medici, which has continued to be marked by the overly narrow, male-oriented 
focus of previous scholarship that concentrated on the Queen mother‟s political interactions with 
her sons and male courters. In response, this thesis has sought to bring greater attention to the 
existence of the often neglected topic of female political networks in relation to one of the most 
formidable female sovereigns in the course of European history, Catherine de‟ Medici.  
Though Catherine started out as a relatively insignificant figure, neglected by her 
husband King Henri II and overshadowed by his beautiful mistress, the premature death of her 
husband unexpectedly propelled her into an unprecedented position of power for a female ruler 
in France during the early modern period. However, despite her status as Queen mother for three 
successive French kings, the degree to which Catherine was permitted to exercise her perceived 
maternal rights over her sons‟ governments remained perpetually in question.  Following King 
Henri‟s death in 1559, rival family factions fought both Catherine and each other for the 
governance of the realm, primarily using discord over religion and the continued existence of 
heresy to discredit one another. Though the Queen mother and the crown had its allies, the Guise 
and Bourbon princes, the most powerful magnates in the realm (and who in theory should have 
safeguarded the interests of the crown), were ambitious and politically irresolute. They took 
every opportunity to pry more authority from the Queen mother and her minor sons.  
In addition to those internal schisms caused by religious affiliations, court factionalism 
and personal ambition, Catherine also inherited a state that was both financially and militarily 




king was calling for the elimination of Calvinism within France, France‟s other traditional 
enemy, the monarch of England, Queen Elizabeth I, was funneling money and men into the 
Huguenot cause, and on top of that, France‟s traditional ally against the English, the Scottish 
monarch, Mary Stuart, was member of the Guise clan.   
It is not the intent of this thesis to minimize the importance of the role that Catherine‟s 
direct personal relationships with her sons and political interactions with her male noblemen had 
on her ability to govern France effectively. The point is to highlight the alternative, though 
decidedly not usual, methods that the Queen mother used to exercise her political influence, 
namely through the construction and utilization of a female political network comprised of both 
her female relatives and the lower-ranking noblewomen within her household. In addition to 
illustrating how Catherine sought to use both her female relatives and noble clients to help 
solidify and prolong her political authority, this thesis has also examined the degree to which her 
incorporation of these women proved useful to the Queen mother, and in some instances, what 
caused Catherine‟s attempted use of certain women to fail.  
The first chapter showed that, despite Élisabeth de Valois‟ lack of male issue and 
premature death, Catherine was able to reap substantial benefits from her eldest daughter‟s 
affiliation with the most powerful monarch in Europe. While Philip was married to Élisabeth, the 
Spanish king was much more inclined to make overtures of friendship to the Queen mother‟s 
government, sending Habsburg troops to help defeat rebellious Huguenot armies and acting as an 
intermediary between the French crown and his male relatives, the Holy Roman Emperor and the 
king of Portugal. In her eldest daughter, Catherine likewise found a valuable ally who could 
positively represent not only French interests, but Catherine‟s personal political agenda at the 




consent to Catherine‟s requests, even Philip affection‟s for Élisabeth had their limits, letters 
written by Catherine‟s ambassadors in Spain concerning the actions of Queen Élisabeth on 
behalf of the French crown indicate that Catherine‟s eldest, in almost every respect, was a useful 
and willing political instrument of Catherine‟s political goals.    
Catherine hoped that Marguerite, like her older sister Élisabeth, would serve as a symbol 
of unity between the French crown and her husband‟s government, and would promote both the 
interests of the French crown and Catherine‟s personal objectives for her husband the King of 
Navarre. However, despite these similar purposes within Catherine‟s kinship-based political 
system, Marguerite was only a marginally effective member of Catherine‟s network. Though 
Marguerite‟s memoirs seems to indicate that the young queen of Navarre possessed a profound 
sense of respect and loyalty for her mother, Marguerite‟s reputation for sexual immorality and 
her foolish political and military ventures rendered her more a liability than an ally as her mother 
had initially hoped.  
As indicated in the second chapter, another member of Catherine‟s network whose 
position proved comparatively unhelpful to Catherine was her daughter-in-law, Elisabeth of 
Austria. Though Elisabeth‟s Habsburg connections may have caused Catherine initially to 
mistrust her daughter-in-law, probably causing the Queen mother to miss some opportunities, it 
seems more likely that Elisabeth‟s lack of utility stemmed from other contributing influences, 
such as Elisabeth‟s reserved nature. Therefore, it must be remembered that issues such as 
individual temperament and intelligence, as well as the nature and strength of relationships 
within the network, likewise played an important role in determining political effectiveness of 




Despite recent revisions in the historiography of Louise de Lorraine-Vaudémont, which 
portrays Louise‟s utility as a consort in a more positive light, the evidence incontrovertibly 
shows that the addition of Louise and her siblings within Catherine‟s political network likewise 
did more harm than good to the French crown. Though Catherine‟s and Henri III‟s intentions for 
Louise and her siblings, were, at least in theory, politically sound, the simultaneous membership 
of this group within the house of Lorraine-Guise prevented them from becoming wholly loyal to 
Catherine and her son. Due to its extensive political, economic, and clerical reach, members of 
the house of Lorraine had vast resources at their disposal, and therefore had little incentive to 
remain loyal to the crown if the Valois monarchy would not allow them to fulfill their political 
ambitions and follow their religious consciences.  
Initially, Catherine faced similar difficulties in incorporating Mary Stuart, Queen of Scots 
into her political network, since Mary‟s Guise uncles both fostered a sense of animosity between 
their niece and the Queen mother, and because they provided an alternative outlet for political 
support, making the Queen of Scots less dependent on the goodwill of her former mother-in-law. 
Mary‟s eventual supplication to Catherine only came when the Queen of Scots found herself 
particularly reliant on the Queen mother to achieve her liberation from her captivity in England. 
Though the house of Lorraine had its own vast diplomatic network, the belligerently Ultra-
Catholic Guise clan was in no position to negotiate with the Protestant Queen of England for the 
release of their royal female relative. For that, Mary needed the intervention of her more 
religiously circumspect and politically palatable former mother-in-law.  
Shifting from the discussion of royal women to that of noblewomen, it seems that the 
primary rationale for both Mademoiselle de Rouhet and Madame de Sauve for entering into these 




within the court in general. During the early modern period, one of the few mediums by which 
women could hope to obtain a “salaried position” and social and economic advancement, was 
through the noble and or royal household, and as previously mentioned, as Queen mother and 
regent, Catherine has an unprecedented degree of patronage powers for a woman.
224
  
In summary, the female-oriented political network of Catherine de‟ Medici was a 
geographically vast, as well as politically and economically diverse, system of women 
accumulated by the Queen mother in the nearly three decades that she exercised political 
influence at the French court. Comprised of both her female relatives and the noblewomen 
residing at court, this system was simultaneously a kinship and patron-client network, whose 
members heeded Catherine‟s requests out of either personal loyalty or want of economic and 
political gain. Despite being previously marginalized within the narrative of the French Wars of 
Religion, due to both a lack of primary sources and the inclination of historians to focus on 
Catherine‟s tumultuous relationship with her sons and male noblemen, these women, 
nonetheless, played an important role in the course of French domestic and international political 
during the sixteenth century, and likewise helped build the reputation of one of the most 
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